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IMPERFECT MEMORY AND CHOICE UNDER RISK1
DANIEL GOTTLIEB
Department of Economics, MIT, daniel_g@mit.edu
Abstract
This paper proposes a model of choice under risk based on imperfect memory
and self-deception. The model assumes that people have preferences over their
own attributes and can, to some extent, manipulate their memories. It leads to a
non-expected utility representation and provides a unied explanation for several
empirical regularities: non-linear probability weights, small-stakes risk aversion,
regret and the competence hypothesis. It also leads to endowment and sunk cost
e¤ects. The model implies that behavior will converge to the one predicted by
expected utility theory after a choice has been made a su¢ ciently large number
of times.
1 Introduction
Choices with uncertain outcomes are an important part of a persons life. The outcomes
often depend on the persons own attributes (e.g., skill, knowledge, or competence) and,
therefore, a¤ect the individuals self-views. Choices that turn out to be wrong typically lead
to self-doubt, while choices that turn out to be right enhance the persons self-image. Hence,
a person who cares about self-image has an incentive to manipulate recollections and beliefs.
Indeed, there is sizeable psychological evidence that people value a positive self-image and
manipulate their memories (see Section 2).
This paper analyzes how the concern for self-image a¤ects an individuals behavior under
risk when memory is imperfect. The model is based on two basic premises: First, individuals
have preferences over their own attributes; Second, they can (to some extent) a¤ect what
they will remember. Both assumptions are largely supported by evidence from the psychol-
ogy literature. Apart from these two assumptions, individuals are assumed to behave as in
standard economic models. Their preferences satisfy the axioms of expected utility theory.
Furthermore, individuals follow Bayesrule and, therefore, are aware of their memory imper-
fection. The model ties the concept of self-deception together with several deviations from
1 I thank Muhamet Yildiz for insightful guidance and detailed suggestions, and Bengt Holmstrom and
Drazen Prelec for valuable comments and suggestions. I also thank Eduardo Azevedo, Abhijit Banerjee,
Roland Benabou, Moshe Cohen, Mathias Dewatripont, Peter Eso, Xavier Gabaix, Lucas Maestri, Jean Tirole,
Birger Wernerfelt, and seminar participants at FGV, Fucape, MIT, and PUC-Rio for comments.
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standard expected utility theory, such as ambiguity aversion, non-linear probability weights,
risk aversion over lotteries with small stakes, regret aversion and the competence hypothesis.
It also leads to endowment and sunk cost e¤ects.
In its simplest version, the model consists of a two-period decision problem. In the rst
period, an individual observes the realization of a signal  2 fH;Lg ; which is informative
about her attributes. Then, she chooses the probability of remembering the realization of
the signal by engaging in memory manipulation. In the second period, the individual applies
Bayesrule to her recollection of the signal. Because Bayesrule implies that, on average, the
individuals interpretation of her recollections are correct, self-deception does not change her
(ex-ante) expected self-views. Hence, from an ex-ante point of view, memory manipulation
is wasteful and, therefore, the agent would prefer not to observe the realization of the signal.
Nevertheless, after observing the signal, the individual has an incentive to manipulate her
memory in order to improve her self-image.
The model leads directly to preferences for avoiding information: people prefer not to
acquire certain information if the expected benet from making an informed decision is lower
than the costs of self-deception. Because individuals anticipate these costs, they may prefer
to make uninformed decisions if the objective value of information is su¢ ciently low. This
result contrasts with Blackwells celebrated theorem, which states that additional information
can never be harmful. It is consistent, however, with the large psychology literature that
connects self-deception and information avoidance. For example, people may avoid health
exams, especially if the value of information is not high enough (e.g. the disease is not easily
treatable) and if being diagnosed with the disease signicantly a¤ects the persons self-image.
Individuals may also engage in self-handicapping strategies, such as under-preparing for
an examination or getting too little sleep before physical exercise, in order to reduce the
informational content of the signal. They may also display a fear of competition since
outcomes from competitors are often informative about the persons own attributes.
When outcomes  2 fH;Lg consist of monetary payments, the individuals expected
utility can be represented by
w (q)uH + [1  w (q)]uL;
where us is the decision-makers utility in the state where s occurs and q is the probability
of state s = H. The probability weight w (q) is lower than the actual probability q when
outcomes lead to memory manipulation. Hence, these preferences provide a self-deception
explanation for non-expected utility and ambiguity aversion.
As in other models that admit non-expected utility representations, the decision-maker
may reject gambles with small but positive expected value. The agent may also exhibit a
gap between the maximum willingness to pay for a good and the minimum compensation
demanded for the same good (endowment e¤ect). However, unlike other non-expected utility
models, the departure from linear weights in my model is directly related to the decision-
makers self-perceived attributes. This departure is consistent with experimental evidence
suggesting that deviations from expected utility theory are associated with the lotteries
being correlated with the decision-makers skill or knowledge (c.f., Heath and Tversky, 1991,
Josephs et al., 1992, Fox and Tversky, 1995, Goodie, 2003, and Goodie and Young, 2007).2 In
particular, the model provides a formalization of the (informal) theory of regret aversion based
on self-perception proposed by Josephs et al. (1992). According to this theory, individuals
2See Subsection 5.2 for a more detailed discussion.
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with low self-image are more likely to make choices that minimize the possibility of regret.
While di¤erent patterns may also be consistent with the model, it is able to predict the
behavior described by Heath and Tversky (1991), according to which individuals prefer a
knowledge-based lottery instead of a knowledge-independent lottery with the same expected
probability of winning if and only if the individual believes that the probability of a positive
outcome is high (competence hypothesis).3 The model also allows the decision maker to
reject small gambles without imposing unrealistic degrees of risk aversion over large gambles.
Two applications illustrate the theory. Successful trading usually requires certain skills
or knowledge. At the very least, the agent must form expectations about how much each
good is worth. In more complex markets, future prices of the goods must also be estimated.
Thus, the outcome of the trade is informative about the persons skills or knowledge. Since
decision-makers avoid information correlated with skills or knowledge, they will accept a trade
only if the expected benet from the trade exceeds a certain positive threshold. Therefore,
self-deception leads to an endowment e¤ect.
The second application considers the inuence of sunk decisions on behavior. In several
contexts, revising ones decision usually involves admitting that a wrong decision was made
and, therefore, it is often informative to the person about her own skills or knowledge. My
model provides a self-deception explanation for the inuence of sunk decisions on behavior
that is consistent with arguments from the literature in psychology.
In a repeated setting in which the person observes a sequence of signals and engages in
memory manipulation after each signal is realized, the attitude towards risk converges to the
one implied by expected utility theory. This result is consistent with the arguments that
people do not exhibit ambiguity aversion over events that have been observed several times
and that experts are subject to much less bias than beginners (e.g. List, 2003, List and Haigh,
2005).
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 briey reviews the psychological
evidence on the memory and the related literature in economics. Section 3 introduces and
discusses the general framework. In Section 4, I describe the implications for information
acquisition. Section 5 considers lotteries over money and provides a representation result. In
Section 6, I analyze a repeated version of the model. Section 7 presents the two applications
of the model. Section 8 summarizes the main results and discusses possible extensions. The
appendix relaxes some assumptions from the model and presents the proofs of the propositions
in the text.4
2 Related Literature
2.1 An Overview of the Psychology Literature
Ego-involvement, or its absence, makes a critical di¤erence in human behavior.
When a person reacts in a neutral, impersonal, routine atmosphere, his behavior
is one thing. But when he is behaving personally, perhaps excitedly, seriously
3The model is also consistent with behavior that Eliaz and Spiegler (2006) have shown to be inconsistent
with the Psychological Expected Utility model of Caplin and Leahy (2001).
4Appendix A relaxes the additive separability assumption made in Section 5; Appendix B considers naive
decision-makers, who are unaware of their memory imperfection; Appendix C considers models with any nite
number of possible states, and Appendix D presents the proofs.
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committed to a task, he behaves quite di¤erently. In the rst condition his ego is
not engaged; in the second, it is. (Gordon W. Allport, 1943, pp. 459).
Psychologists have largely documented a human tendency to deny or misrepresent real-
ity to oneself (i.e., engage in self-deception). In general, people consider themselves to be
smart,knowledgeable,and nice.Information conicting with this image is usually ig-
nored or denied. Greenwald (1980, pp. 605), for example, argued that [o]ne of the best
established recent ndings in social psychology is that people perceive themselves readily as
the origin of good e¤ects and reluctantly as the origin of ill e¤ects. Similarly, Gollwitzer,
Earle, and Stephan (1982, pp. 702), claimed that the asymmetrical attributions after success
and failureis a rmly established nding.
People are also more likely to remember successes than failures (Korner, 1950). After
choosing between two di¤erent options, they tend to recall the positive aspects of the chosen
option and the negative aspects of the forgone option (Mather, Shar, and Johnson, 2003).
Relatedly, individuals overestimate their achievements and readily nd evidence that they
possess attributes which they believe to be correlated with success in personal or professional
life (Kunda and Sanitioso, 1989; Quattrone and Tversky, 1984). Success is usually attributed
to ones own ability and e¤ort, whereas failure tends to be attributed to bad luck or other
external variables (Gollwitzer, Earle, and Stephan, 1982, Zuckerman, 1979).5 In group set-
tings, where each individuals contribution cannot be unequivocally determined, people tend
to attribute to themselves a larger share of the groups outcome after a success and a smaller
share after a failure (Johnston, 1967).
Self-assessments and the memory are intrinsically connected. In his Essay Concerning
Human Understanding, Locke (1690) identied the self with memory. Mill (1829, Vol. 2, pp.
174) argued that [t]he phenomenon of Self and that of Memory are merely two sides of the
same fact.Modern cognitive psychologists dene the self as the mental representation of
oneself, including all that one knows about oneself (Kihlstrom et al., 2002). Therefore, a
model of self-views should devote considerable attention to memory.
In psychology, the memory is typically viewed as imperfect and manipulable. Rapaport
(1961), for example, conceived memory not as an ability to revive accurately impressions
once obtained but as the integration of impressions into the whole personality and their revival
according to the needs of the whole personality.Allport (1943) believed that self-deception
was a mechanism of ego defense and the maintenance of self-esteem. Hilgard (1949, pp.
374) argued that the need for self-deception arises because of a more fundamental need to
maintain or to restore self-esteem. Anything belittling the self is to be avoided.Festinger
(1957) suggested that individuals have a tendency to seek consistency among their cognitions
(i.e., beliefs and opinions). He labeled the discomfort felt when one is presented with evidence
that conicts with ones beliefs and the resulting e¤ort to distort those beliefs or opinions
cognitive dissonance. In a review of the recent literature in social psychology, Sedikides,
Green, and Pinter (2004, pp. 165) describe people as striving for a positive self-denition or
the avoidance of a negative self-denition (...) at the expense of accuracy and truthfulness.
According to them, [m]emory serves the function of shielding a positive self-denition from
negativity.
5Van den Steen (2004) presents a model of rational agents with di¤ering priors that generates these biases.
Harbaugh (2008) provides a career concerns explanation for prospect theory.
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There are several reasons why people may want to believe in things that are not true.
First, there may be a hedonic value of positive self-views so that people simply like to think
that they have these attributes.6 Second, as argued by Compte and Postlewaite (2004),
a person may benet from having overcondent beliefs in situations where emotions a¤ect
performance. Third, manipulating ones own beliefs may facilitate the deception of others.
Thus, holding an optimistic view of oneself may help convincing others of ones own value.7
Fourth, there may be a motivational value of belief manipulation. As Benabou and Tirole
(2002) and Weinberg (2006) argued, condence in ones ability may help the person set more
ambitious goals and persist in adverse situations.
This paper abstracts from the exact reason why people may value a positive self-image.
The model developed here is based on the two basic ideas discussed above. First, individuals
have preferences over their attributes. Second, they can a¤ect what they will remember. The
paper focuses on how memory manipulations a¤ect the persons attitudes towards risk.
As the opening quote from Allport demonstrates, psychologists have long realized that
self-deception may change a persons behavior. Festinger (1957, pp. 3), for example, argued
that [w]hen dissonance is present, in addition to trying to reduce it, the person will actively
avoid situations and information which would likely increase the dissonance.More recently,
Josephs et al. (1992, pp. 27) argued that [r]isky decisions are potentially threatening to self-
esteem because the chosen alternative will occasionally yield a less desirable outcome than
would some other alternative. When a less desirable outcome does occur, it can sometimes
lead people to doubt their judgement and ability, especially when the decision is an important
one.
This paper shows that incorporating self-deception in a standard model of choice can lead
to a unied theory of choice under risk that is consistent with economic phenomena such as
ambiguity aversion, risk aversion over lotteries with small stakes, regret, and the competence
hypothesis. It also leads to endowment and sunk cost e¤ects.
2.2 An Overview of the Literature on Imperfect Memory
The economic literature on imperfect memory can be divided in two strands. The rst
assumes that decision makers are naive and act as if they have not forgotten anything (Mul-
lainathan, 2002). The other strand assumes that decision makers are sophisticated, so that
they draw Bayesian inferences given that they might have forgotten things. This paper follows
the latter approach and considers the case of rational decision makers subject to imperfect
recall.8 As suggested by Piccione and Rubinstein (1997), the resulting game of imperfect re-
call is solved by the principle of multiself consistency,whereby decisions made in di¤erent
stages are viewed as being made by di¤erent incarnations of the decision maker.
Models of limited memory are a special case of imperfect memory. They were originally
proposed by Robbins (1956) in the mathematical statistics literature. He suggested a decision
rule for choosing between two lotteries with unknown distributions that was conditional on
6For example, in Schellings (1985) theory of the mind as a consuming organ, self-views have a hedonic
value.
7As argued by Trivers (2000, pp. 115), [b]eing unconscious of ongoing deception may more deeply hide
the deception. Conscious deceivers will often be under the stress that accompanies attempted deception.
This argument is modelled formally by Byrne and Kurland (2001) in an evolutionary game.
8Appendix B considers the case of naive decision makers.
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a nite number of outcomes (nite memory). In a series of papers, Cover and Hellman
characterized optimal solutions to some nite memory problems.9 More recently, economists
have independently studied optimal decision making subject to limited memory. Dow (1991)
considered the behavior of a consumer looking for the lowest price. Wilson (2003) studied
how limited memory leads to certain biases in belief formation. Hirshleifer and Welch (2002)
considered informational cascades generated by players who observe actions but not the
information leading to such actions.
In a sequence of papers, Benabou and Tirole have used imperfect memory frameworks
to study questions from the psychology literature. Based on the assumption that agents
recalled actions but not their motivations, they have proposed theories of personal rules
and internal commitments (Benabou and Tirole, 2004), prosocial behavior (Benabou and
Tirole, 2006b), and identity and taboos (Benabou and Tirole, 2006c). Using a model of self-
deception, Benabou and Tirole (2002, 2006a) analyzed the provision of self-motivation and
the formation of collective beliefs and ideologies.
The model of memory presented here is general enough to allow for an agnostic view of
the behavior of the memory system. It encompasses both Benabou and Tiroles self-deception
framework and a static version of the limited memory framework as special cases. This paper
is also connected to the economic literature on cognitive dissonance (Akerlof and Dickens,
1982, Rabin, 1994). This literature assumes that agents derive utility from their beliefs and
that they can, at some cost, choose their beliefs. Separately, Lowenstein (1987), Caplin and
Leahy (2001 and 2004), and K½oszegi (2006) have studied models with anticipatory emotions.10
3 General Framework
3.1 The Decision Problem
The model examines a decision maker (DM) who has preferences over her attributes : At-
tributes  may be interpreted as skills, knowledge, or competence as well as a parameter of
anticipatory utility. Let  be a non-empty subset of R representing the possible values of 
and let F (:) denote the agents prior distribution of .11
The DM acts in 3 periods (t = 0; 1; 2). In period 0; she chooses an action a from a
non-empty, compact subset of a nite dimensional Euclidean space A: For example, a can
be an investment decision or a decision of whether to undertake some medical examination.
The set A can also be a singleton, in which case the agent makes no choice in period 0.12
In period t = 1; an outcome a, which can be either high (H) or low (L), is observed.
The outcome a may be a purely informative signal, entering the agents preferences only
9See Hellman and Cover (1973) for a review of the main results in this literature.
10Brunnermeier and Parker (2005) proposed a theory of optimal expectations, according to which indi-
viduals choose their beliefs balancing the gains from anticipating a higher future utility with the losses from
suboptimal decision-making. Similarly, Hvide (2002) proposed the notion of pragmatic beliefs, which are
the beliefs that maximize the individuals utility. Bernheim and Thomadsen (2005) showed that memory im-
perfections and anticipatory emotions may lead to a resolution of Newcombs Paradox and sustain cooperation
in the Prisoners Dilemma.
11 can be continuous or discrete, as long as it contains at least two elements (otherwise,  cannot be
random). Note that we have not assumed that the agent has a correct prior distribution over : Therefore,
agents are allowed to hold optimistic or pessimistic beliefs about their attributes.
12 In some applications, the set A may also include the possibility of not observing a signal.
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indirectly through her beliefs about her attributes : It may also a¤ect the agents preferences
directly. For example, a medical exam consists of a purely informative signal, whereas the
outcomes of an investment a¤ect an individual not only through their informational content
but also through the di¤erent monetary payments associated with them. I denote by qa 2
(0; 1) the probability of observing a high outcome given action a 2 A: A high outcome
is assumed to be more favorable than a low outcome in the sense of rst-order stochastic
dominance:
F (ja = H)  F (ja = L) for all  2 ; (1)
with strict inequality for some value of ; and for all a 2 A:
Following Rabin (1994), Benabou and Tirole (2002, 2006a), and Benabou (2008), I assume
that the individual can, at a cost, inuence her recollections. The DM remembers the outcome
s 2 fH;Lg with probability
s +ms;
where the parameter s 2 [0; 1] is the agents naturalrate of remembering outcome s: This
rate determines the probability that the DM recollects the outcome if she does not employ
any manipulation e¤ort. However, the DM is also able to depart from the natural rate of
forgetting the outcome by exerting e¤ort ms 2 [ s; 1  s] in period t = 1: Engaging in
memory manipulation ms leads to a cost of  s (ms)  0; s 2 fH;Lg : The agents recollection
of the outcome a is denoted by ̂a 2 fH;L;?g ; where we write ̂a = ? if the outcome has
been forgotten.
In period t = 2; the DM takes an action b in a non-empty, compact subset of a nite
dimensional Euclidean space B: For example, b can be a decision of whether to continue with
some previous investment or whether to undertake some medical treatment. B can also be a
singleton, in which case the DM does not act after observing the outcome. Figure 1 presents
the informational structure.
Preferences satisfy the standard axioms of expected utility theory. Therefore, there exists
utility function u : ABfH;Lg ! R representing the DMs preferences. Furthermore,
u (; a; b; ) is strictly increasing in  for all (a; b; ) 2 AB  fH;Lg.
When u (; a; b;H) = u (; a; b; L) for all (; a; b) 2   A  B; we refer to outcomes as
signals since they do not a¤ect the agents utility directly. In this case, we say that the
model has purely informative signals. When signals are purely informative and A and B are
singletons, we say that signals have a purely hedonic value. In models where signals have a
purely hedonic value, the DM does not need to take any decision and the only reason for
memory manipulation is the improvement of the individuals self-views.
We refer to the case where u (; a; b;H) > u (; a; b; L) for all (; a; b) 2   A  B as a
model of monetary outcomes. In this case, outcomes are interpreted as monetary payments
and a high outcome raises the agents utility both directly and through beliefs about .13
The cost of memory manipulation  s can be related to psychic costs (stress from repres-
sion of negative information or e¤ort to focus on positive information), time (searching for
reassuring information or excuses, lingering over positive feedback), or real resources (avoid-
ing certain cues and interactions or eliminating evidence). They can also be interpreted as
13Although the case described above, where the outcome with a higher monetary payment provides more
favorable news about the DMs attributes, is the most intuitive, this is not necessary for our results. Alter-
natively, one could assume that the outcome with a higher monetary payment is bad news about the DMs
attributes.
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Figure 1: Informational Structure
the shadow costs of memory in a limited information framework. Remembering an outcome
with probability above its natural rate s requires an individual to focus on it and on infor-
mation correlated with it. In turn, this restricts the amount of attention available to other
information (which has shadow cost  s). Similarly, forgetting an outcome with probability
above the natural rate 1   s requires an individual to focus on confronting evidence which
again restricts the amount of attention available to other potentially useful information.14
Assumption 1 The cost of memory manipulation  s (ms) is strictly decreasing in ms < 0;
strictly increasing in ms > 0, convex, twice-continuously di¤erentiable, and such that
 s (0) = 0; s 2 fH;Lg :
Figure 2 depicts the costs of memory manipulation implied by Assumption 1. I further
assume that the agent forgets a high outcome with some positive probability if she does not
exert any e¤ort:15
Assumption 2 H < 1:
The model can also be seen as a conict between a hot or impulsive self and a
coldself. The hot self (self 1) wants to minimize current losses from negative information
and maximize the current gains from positive information.16 The cold self (self 2) wants to
circumvent the manipulations made by the hot self in order to make a correct inference. The
hot self exerts e¤orts mL and mH in order to manipulate the beliefs of the cold self. Then,
14For example, Steeles (1988) self-a¢ rmation theory argues that people cope with negative outcomes in
one domain by focusing in other, unrelated domains.
15 If H = 1; then the model becomes trivial. Since the agent always recalls high outcomes, she will perfectly
infer that  = L was observed if she recollects ̂ = ?: Therefore, she will never engage in memory manipulation.
16This interpretation assumes that the hot self is rational in the sense of taking into account the benets and
costs of memory manipulation. Several papers in social psychology have documented that individuals tend
to be more realistic and impartial when making important decisions (c.f., Taylor and Gollwitzer, 1995, and
references therein). Therefore, self-deception seems to decrease when the cost of a mistake increases. Prelec
(2008) presented experimental evidence where self-deception responds positively to its expected benets.
Similarly to this interpretation, Bodner and Prelec (2002) present a signaling model between an agents
privately informed gut and the agents uninformed mind.
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Figure 2: Cost of Memory
the cold self applies Bayes rule in order to lter these manipulations and make a correct
decision b.17
As the following examples show, the general framework encompasses other models of
imperfect memory.
Example 1 (The Forgetfulness Model of Benabou and Tirole, 2002) Take L = 1;
H = 0 and  H (mH) = +1 for all mH > 0 so that high outcomes are always forgotten
(i.e., H +mH = 0). Figure 3 presents the informational structure in this case. This is the
memory framework from Benabou and Tirole (2002). It can be interpreted as a model of bad
news or no news. If the agent receives bad news, she can exert an e¤ort mL 2 [ 1; 0] in order
to forget them.
If the state ? is reinterpreted as the recollection of a high outcome, then the model from
Example 1 becomes one where the agent is able to convince herself that a low outcome was
a high outcome.18 Hence, memory manipulation would allow the DM to believe that she
observed an outcome  = H: This reinterpretation is compatible with neurological evidence
from Prelec (2008), who showed that subjects experience heavy brain activity only when they
try to convince themselves that a bad outcome was actually a good one. In the other states
(both when they acknowledge a mistake or when they believe to have been correct), no such
activity is detected. Hence, Example 1 can be interpreted as the agent incurring psychological
costs when she tries to convince herself that a bad outcome was actually a good one.
Example 2 (The Limited Memory Model) Take L = H = 0 so that the DM forgets
any outcome if she does not employ memory e¤orts. Then, the framework becomes a model
of limited memory. In this model, the DM must allocate a limited amount of memory in
17The model can be interpreted as a formalization of the neurophysiological argument put forth by Trivers
(2000). According to this interpretation, self 1 would be the persons unconscious process of information
manipulation. In the context of intertemporal choice, several papers have proposed dual self models (c.f.
Thaler and Shefrin, 1981, Fudenberg and Levine, 2006, and Brocas and Carrillo, 2008).
18 In this model, the agent would never choose to believe that a high outcome was actually low.
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Figure 3: Forgetfulness Model
order to store information. By spending a memory cost  s (ms) ; she remembers an outcome
s 2 fH;Lg with probability ms: A higher e¤ort ms can be interpreted as having greater
memory resources used to store the information.19
The following examples present applications of the general framework to specic environ-
ments:
Entrepreneurship Example An employed individual is considering quitting her job
and starting a new company. Building a successful company requires certain entrepreneurial
skills which are unknown to the individual. Therefore, a success provides favorable news
about the individuals skills. If she decides not to quit her job, the individual obtains a wage
w 2 R+ and does not learn any information about her skills.
In this paper, this situation is modeled as follows. Let the individuals career choice be
denoted by a = E if she becomes an entrepreneur and by a =W if she remains a worker and
let  denote the individuals entrepreneurial skills. The outcome from starting a company is
denoted by ; which is equal to H in the case of success and L in the case of failure. After
the outcome  is observed, the entrepreneur may engage in memory manipulation. In this
model, there is no ex-post choice (B is a singleton). The agents decision tree is presented in
Figure 5.
Appendix C considers a more general model. In that model, an outcome is a vector  =
(s; r) consisting of a binary variable reecting whether or not the company was successful, s 2
fS; Fg ; and an external variable r 2 R which a¤ects the outcomes but is independent of the
agents attributes (e.g., general market conditions, economy-wide shocks). The entrepreneur
always remembers whether the company succeeded or failed but may forget the prevailing
external conditions r:
19Dow (1991) considers a consumer who searches sequentially for the lowest price, but who only remembers
each price as belonging to a nite number of categories. Wilson (2003) considers a decision-maker who must
act after a large number of periods but whose memory is restricted to a nite number of states.
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Figure 4: Limited Memory Model
Succeeding under adverse conditions provides good news about the individuals skills.
Similarly, failing under favorable conditions is bad news about her skills. In this model, that
the agent will manipulate her memory in order to forget positive external shocks and remem-
ber negative shocks. This result is consistent with the psychological literature described in
Section 2, which shows that success is usually attributed to ones own attributes whereas
failure tends to be attributed to bad luck or other external variables.
Section 5 will show that self-deception will prevent some individuals from becoming entre-
preneurs even when the expected monetary payo¤s from starting a new company are higher
than the payo¤ from remaining on the previous job.
Used Car Example An individual is considering whether to purchase a used car or to
use public transportation. A used car may be defective. Moreover, detecting whether the car
is defective requires certain skills. Therefore, purchasing a defective car conveys unfavorable
information about the buyers skills and requires the car to be xed. If she decides to use
public transportation, no information is learned.
This situation is modeled as follows. Let a = C denote the choice of purchasing a used car
and let a = PT denote the choice of using public transportation. Denote by  = H the case
where the car is non-defective and  = L the case where it is defective. After the consumer
learns that the car was defective, she may manipulate her memory in order to forget that
it needed to be xed. Similarly, if the car was non-defective, she may exert some e¤ort to
remember that the car did not need to be xed. Assuming the memory system from the
forgetfulness model of Example 1, we obtain the decision tree depicted in Figure 6. Section
5 will show that if the expected monetary benet from buying the used car is positive but
lower than the expected self-deception costs, the individual will prefer not to purchase it.
3.2 Modeling as a Multiself Game
This paper follows Piccione and Rubinstein (1997) in modeling a decision problem with
imperfect memory as a game between di¤erent selves. The decision maker is treated as a
collection of selves, each of them unable to control the behavior of future selves. As will be
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Figure 5: Entrepreneurship Example
described in Subsection 3.3, the decision made by an agent with imperfect recall corresponds
to the perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) of this game between selves.20
The extensive form of the multiself game is presented in Figure 7. There are two players:
self 1 and self 2. Both selves have the same utility functions but di¤erent information sets. In
period 0; self 1 chooses an action a 2 A: Then, nature plays a high outcome with probability
qa and a low outcome with probability 1   qa: In period 1; conditional on the outcome
s 2 fH;Lg ; self 1 decides the amount of memory manipulation ms. Then, given the outcome
s and the manipulation e¤ort ms; nature plays ̂ = s with probability s +ms and ̂ = ?
with probability 1   s   ms. In period 2, self 2 observes the recollection ̂ and takes an
action b 2 B: Then, both selves get payo¤ E [u (; a; b; ) j̂]   s (ms) :
Because the DM has preferences over , she has an interim incentive to manipulate her
beliefs by exerting e¤ort ms: However, the set of possible beliefs that an agent can hold
is restricted by the assumption that recollections are interpreted according to Bayes rule.
Thus, the agent makes correct inferences about her attributes  given her recollections ̂:
Equivalently, we can conceptualize an inferential selfwho tries to make a correct in-
ference about the agents attributes given the recollections. This inferential self chooses the
agents expected utility so as to minimize a quadratic loss function:
u̂ (a; b; ) = argmin
û2R
Z 1
 1
[û  u (; a; b; )]2 dF (j̂) :
The solution to this program is u̂ (a; b; ) =
R
u (; a; b; ) dF (j̂) ; which is the Bayes
estimator of u (; a; b; ) given the recollection ̂. Thus, by minimizing a quadratic loss
20For the games considered here, the set of sequential equilibria coincides with the set of PBE.
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Figure 6: Used Car Example
function, the inferential self constrains the decision-maker to be a Bayesian given her memory
imperfection.
Remark 1 Denote the expected value of  conditional on the observed outcome a by a
and the expected attributes conditional on the recollection ̂a by ̂̂a : ̂̂a is less variable
than a in the sense of second-order stochastic dominance.
21 Therefore, because a is
the Bayes estimate of  given the outcome a; forgetfulness implies that the decision-maker
updates observed outcomes a less than implied by Bayesrule. This result is consistent with
experimental evidence from Falk, Hu¤man, and Sunde (2006).
3.3 Solution Concept
As described in the previous subsection, the decision made by an agent with imperfect recall is
modeled as the perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) of the multiself game. Let  (:j̂) denote
the DMs posterior beliefs about  given ̂ and let E [:j̂] denote the expectation operator
with respect to  (:j̂) : Given a prole of memory manipulation manipulation (mL;mH) ; let
E̂a [:jmL;mH ] denote the expectation with respect to the distribution of ̂a.
Denition 1 A PBE of the game is a strategy prole (a; b;mH (a) ;m

L (a)) and posterior
beliefs  (:j̂a) such that:
1. a 2 argmax
a2A

E̂a [E [u (a; b

a (̂a) ; ; a) j̂a] jmL (a) ;mH (a)]
 q H (mH (a))  (1  q) L (mL (a))

;
21See Appendix D for the proof.
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Figure 7: Extensive Form
2. ms (a) 2 argmaxms

(s +ms)E [u (a; b

a (̂a) ; ; s) j̂a = s]
+ (1  s  ms)E [u (a; ba (̂a) ; ; s) j̂a = ?]   s (ms)

;
s 2 fH;Lg;
3. ba (̂) 2 argmax
b2B
fE [u (a; b; ; a) j̂a = ̂]g ;
4.  (j̂a = ̂) is obtained by Bayes rule if Pr (̂a = ̂jmL (a) ;mH (a)) > 0; 8̂ 2
fL;H;?g.
Conditions 1   3 are the standard sequential rationality conditions. Condition 1 states
that self 1 chooses an ex-ante action a that maximizes the agents expected utility in period 0
given the behavior of self 2. Condition 2 states that, conditional on each outcome s 2 fH;Lg ;
self 1 chooses the amount of manipulation that maximizes the her expected payo¤. Condition
3 states that self 2 takes an action that maximizes her utility given the beliefs she holds about
the manipulation employed by self 1:
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Condition 4 is the standard consistency condition, requiring that beliefs of self 2 satisfy
Bayesrule given the strategy of self 1. For every recollection ̂ that is reached with positive
probability, it implies that  (j̂a) = F (j̂a) : Because of Bayesian updating, Condition 3
becomes
ba (̂) 2 argmax
b
Z
u (a; b; ; ) dF (j̂a = ̂) ;
for any recollection ̂ that is reached with positive probability. The following proposition
establishes the existence of a PBE:
Proposition 1 (Existence) There exists a PBE.
Dene the expected utilities given a = H and a = L by
uH (a; b; a) 
Z
u (a; b; ; a) dF (ja = H) ; and (2)
uL (a; b; a) 
Z
u (a; b; ; a) dF (ja = L) :
Given the recollection of a high signal, ̂a = H, self 2 infers that a high signal was observed
in period 1: Hence, Bayesian updating implies that the expected utility of self 1 conditional
on ̂a = H is uH (a; ba (H) ;H) : Similarly, the expected utility of self 1 conditional on ̂a = L
is uL (a; b (L) ; L) :
Let mL (a) and m

H (a) denote the amount of memory manipulation that self 2 believes
was employed in period 1. Note that the PBE concept implies that mL (a) and m

H (a) are
taken as given by self 1 when choosing the amount of memory manipulation to exert. If
the DM forgets which signal was observed in period 1 (i.e., she recollects ̂a = ?); then
there is a probability (1  qa) (1  L  mL (a)) that a = L was observed and a probability
qa (1  H  mH (a)) that a = H was observed. Thus, the expected utility given ̂a = ? is
u? (a; ba (?) ; a)   (mL;mH)uH (a; ba (?) ; a) (3)
+ [1   (mL;mH)]uL (a; ba (?) ; a) ;
where  (mL;mH)  qa(1 H mH)qa(1 H mH)+(1 qa)(1 L mL) is the conditional probability of a = H
implied by Bayesrule.
Conditions 2 and 3 from Denition 1 state that, after observing signal a = s 2 fH;Lg ;
self 1 chooses ms to maximize
(s +ms)us (a; ba (s) ; s) + (1  s  ms)u? (a; ba (?) ; s)   s (ms) :
Using equation (3), the expected utility after a low signal can be written as
uL (a; ba (?) ; L) + (L +mL) [uL (a; ba (L) ; L)  uL (a; ba (?) ; L)] (4)
+(1  L  mL) (mL (a) ;mH (a)) [uH (a; ba (?) ; L)  uL (a; ba (?) ; L)]   L (mL)
Note that self 1 takes three factors into account when choosing the amount of e¤ort to for-
get bad news. First, forgetting a low signal leads to a higher utility through a more favorable
inference about  since uH (a; ba (?) ; L) > uL (a; ba (?) ; L) (self-deception factor). Second, it
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leads to a sub-optimal choice of b since uL (a; ba (L) ; L)  uL (a; ba (?) ; L) (decision-making
factor). Third, self-deception leads to a memory cost of  L (mL) (memory cost factor).
Analogously, conditional on a high signal, self 1 chooses mH to maximize:
(H +mH)

[1   (mL (a) ;mH (a))]
+uH (a; ba (H) ;H)  uH (a; ba (?) ;H)

(5)
+u? (a; ba (?) ;H)   H (mH) :
This equation displays the three factors that determine the amount of e¤ort to remember
good news. First, remembering a high signal leads to a higher utility through a more favorable
inference about  since uH (a; ba (?) ;H) > uL (a; ba (?) ;H) : It also leads to better decision-
making since uH (a; ba (H) ;H) > uH (a; ba (?) ;H) : However, it leads to a memory cost of
 H (mH) :
The improvement in decision-making leads the DM to engage in an e¤ort to remember a
high signal. The e¤ect from self-image also leads the DM to exert an e¤ort to remember the
high signal. Because small amounts of memory manipulation have second-order costs, the
DM always remembers a high signal with probability above her natural rate H :
Proposition 2 (Remembering Good News) Suppose that  s is strictly convex, s 2 fH;Lg :
Then, in any PBE, mH (a) > 0 8a 2 A:
The DMs ex-ante expected utility (in period 0) is
E̂a [E [u (; a; ba (̂) ; ) j̂]]  q H (mH (a))  (1  q) L (mL (a)) : (6)
As in other decision problems with imperfect recall, the timing of decisions has important
implications for the solution. If the agent could commit to a strategy at an ex-ante stage,
she would generally choose a di¤erent amount of memory manipulation.
Consider, for example, the model of purely hedonic signals. In this case, equations (4) and
(5) imply that the DM faces a trade-o¤ between self-deception and memory costs. Manipu-
lating ones memory into forgetting a low signal directly increases the individuals expected
payo¤ by raising the probability that the signal is forgotten. Similarly, exerting e¤ort to
remember a high signal directly raises her expected payo¤ by decreasing the probability
that the signal is forgotten. However, these manipulations also decrease the DMs expected
payo¤ indirectly by reducing the relative probability of a high signal when the signal is for-
gotten. Bayesian updating implies that the indirect e¤ects exactly cancel the direct e¤ects
out. Because the DM is not fooled on average, she adjusts the expected attributes given
̂ = ? to take into account the relative frequency that each signal is forgotten. Therefore,
from an ex-ante perspective, memory manipulation only leads to memory costs and the DM
would prefer not to engage in memory manipulation at all (mH = mL = 0). However, the
multiself approach implies that self 1 does not take into account the indirect e¤ects from
memory manipulation and, therefore, chooses to engage in memory manipulation.22 Hence,
unlike in decision problems with perfect recall where ex-ante optimal strategies are always
time-consistent, the ex-ante optimal strategy is time-inconsistent.23
22Note that the DM would never choose to undo the memory manipulation in period t = 2 and nd out the
true outcome  if she had a chance to do so.
23See Piccione and Rubinstein (1997) for a discussion of decision problems with imperfect recall. In the
present model, because all nodes are reached with positive probability, the two equilibrium concepts proposed
there (multiself consistency and modied multiself consistency) coincide.
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In cases where outcomes a¤ect ex-post actions b (i.e., information has positive value),
it is ex-ante optimal to choose some positive amount of memory manipulation.24 In these
cases, the optimal strategy from an ex-ante perspective would always have a probability to
remember (weakly) above the natural rate s; s 2 fL;Hg.
Recall that self 1 takes three factors into account when choosing the amount of memory
manipulation: (i) self-deception, (ii) decision-making, and (iii) memory costs. As discussed
previously, Bayesian updating implies that the self-deception e¤ect vanishes from the DMs
ex-ante utility. Since only factors (ii) and (iii) would be taken into account, the DM would
choose to remember good news and to forget bad news less frequently if she could commit to
a strategy in period 0: Let the ex-ante expected utility be denoted by
U

mH ;mL; a; fb (̂)g̂2fH;L;?g

= E̂a [E [u (; a; b (̂) ; ) j̂]]
 q H (mH)  (1  q) L (mL) :
Proposition 3 establishes this claim formally:
Proposition 3 (Excessive Manipulation) Let

~mH (a) ; ~mL (a) ;
n
~ba (̂)
o
̂2fH;L;?g

be
a maximizer of U given action a and suppose U is a concave function of mH and mL:25
Then, in any PBE with manipulations mH (a) and m

L (a) ;
mH (a)  ~mH (a) and mL (a)  ~mL (a)
for all a 2 A; with at least one of the inequalities being strict.
3.4 Equilibrium when Information has Purely Hedonic Value
In order to illustrate the impact of self-deception on choice, this subsection considers the
simple case where signals are purely informative and the DM does not take any action (i.e.,
information has purely hedonic value). In this case, the only reason for memory manipulation
is the improvement of the DMs self-views. Since remembering a low signal decreases self 1s
expected utility, she would never choose manipulate her memory in order to remember a low
signal (i.e., mL  0). Analogously, she would never manipulate her memory so as to forget a
high signal (i.e., mH  0).
Since, in the purely hedonic case considered in this subsection, A and B are singletons
and the outcome of the signal does not enter the agents utility directly, I omit the terms
a; b; and a from the DMs von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function. Let u  uH   uL
denote the payo¤ gain by observing a high signal instead of a low signal.
Proposition 4 (Forgetting Bad News) Suppose that  s is strictly convex, s 2 fH;Lg :
Then in any PBE, mH > 0  mL: Furthermore,
u   0H (1  H) =) mH = 1  H and mL = 0;
u <  0H (1  H) =) 0 < mH < 1  H and mL < 0:
24More precisely, let b (̂)jmL;mH denote the action that maximizes the DMs utility given recollection ̂
and conditional on manipulation e¤orts mL and mH : Then, b (H)jmL=mH=0 6= b (?)jmL=mH=0 implies that
the manipulation e¤ort mH that maximizes the ex-ante expected utility is strictly positive. Analogously, if
b (L)jmL=mH=0 6= b (?)jmL=mH=0 then mL that maximizes the ex-ante expected utility is strictly positive.
25 It is straightforward to show that U is always a concave function of mH and mL when B is a singleton.
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If the marginal cost of remembering good news is lower than its marginal benet for all
mH 2 [ H ; 1   H); i.e.  0H (1  H)  u, then the DM always remembers high signals.
In this case, there is no point in trying to forget a low signal since the agent perfectly infers
that a low signal was observed when she recollects ̂ = ?.
If the marginal cost of remembering good news is higher than its marginal benet for
some mH 2 [ H ; 1   H); then the DM forgets high signals with positive probability. In
this case, because the cost of a small amount of memory manipulation is of second-order, bad
news are remembered with probability below the natural rate L; i.e., m

L < 0:
Next, I characterize the PBE in the forgetfulness model of Benabou and Tirole (Example
1) and in the limited memory model (Example 2) when signals have purely hedonic value.
3.4.1 The forgetfulness model of Benabou and Tirole (2002)
Consider the forgetfulness model of Example 1 and suppose that  L is strictly convex. Given
a low signal, self 1 solves
max
mL2[ 1;0]
(1 +mL)uL  mL f (mL; 0)uH + [1   (mL; 0)]uLg    L (mL) : (7)
Applying Kuhn-Tuckers theorem and substituting the equilibrium condition mL = mL; we
obtain
qu
q   (1  q)mL
=   0L (mL) ; (8)
in any interior equilibrium.
Let mL be implicitly dened by equation (8). From the implicit function theorem, such
mL 2 R exists and is unique. The following proposition characterizes the PBE and presents
some comparative statics results:
Proposition 5 (Characterization) In the forgetfulness model when signals have a purely
hedonic value, there exists an essentially unique PBE.26 The equilibrium manipulation e¤ort
is
mL =
(
 0
 1
L

  quq (1 q)mL

 1
if u <   
0
L( 1)
q ; and
if u    
0
L( 1)
q :
Furthermore, the absolute value of belief manipulation jmLj is:
1. increasing in the benet of manipulation u (for uL xed),
2. decreasing in the marginal cost of manipulation, and
3. increasing in q; the probability of not observing a signal.
26The PBE is essentially unique in the sense that all PBE feature the same choices of actions a and b;
the same manipulation e¤orts mL and mH ; and the same beliefs for all recollections that are reached with
positive probability. Equilibria may diverge only with respect to beliefs at recollections that are not reached
with positive probability.
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The comparative statics above follows from simple cost-benet comparisons. When the
marginal benet of self-deception is higher or the marginal cost is lower, the agent chooses
to engage in more self-deception. This result is consistent with the experimental evidence
presented by Prelec (2008), which suggests that self-deception is increasing in the benets of
manipulation.
Also, recall that in this model, no news is good news. Therefore, when the probability
of not observing a signal q is higher, it becomes more credible that the individual has not
manipulated her beliefs into forgetting a low signal. Hence, an increase in q increases the
marginal benet of self-deception, and this in turn leads to an increase in the amount of
memory manipulation jmLj :
3.4.2 The limited memory model
Consider the limited memory model of Example 2. Given a high signal, self 1 solves
max
mH2[ 1;1]
mHuH + (1 mH) f (0;mH)uH + [1   (0;mH)]uLg    H (mH) :
Proceeding as in Proposition 5, it follows that the set of PBE e¤orts are characterized by
(1  q)u
1  q + q
 
1 mH
 =  0H (mH) , (9)
if u   0H (1)
h
1 + q1 q (1 m

H)
i
; and
mH = 1 if u   0H (1) :
Since both sides of equation (9) are increasing in mH , there may be multiple interior
equilibria. It may also simultaneously feature interior equilibria and a corner equilibrium.27
A person that believes she often forgets good signals is not hurt much by not recalling a good
signal. Therefore, she will not manipulate her memory enough and, in equilibrium, she will
often forget good signals. On the other hand, a person that usually remembers good signals
is severely hurt by recollecting ̂ = ?: Therefore, she will have more incentive to remember
good signals. As I show in the next section, these equilibria are welfare ranked (from an
ex-ante perspective): The equilibrium with the lowest amount of memory manipulation is
preferred. The individual may be caught in a self-trap where she exerts more manipulation
e¤ort because self 1 believes that she will have engaged in more memory manipulation.28
4 Purely Informative Signals and Information Acquisition
Suppose the decision-maker can choose whether or not to observe an informative signal.
When would she prefer to observe it? This section is concerned with the implications of
27For example, if  0H (1)  u   0r (1)
h
1 + q
1 q (1 m

H)
i
; there exist both an equilibrium with mH = 1
and an interior equilibrium with mH implicitly dened by equation (9).
28The existence of multiple equilibria is interesting since there seems to be a large heterogeneity in the
amount of self-deception accross di¤erent people (c.f., Prelec, 2008). However, since the results presented here
hold in all PBE, they would also be obtained if one applied a selection criterion.
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memory manipulation for the acquisition of information. I show that the DM will only
observe a signal if the benet of making an informed decision exceeds the cost of memory
manipulation. Subsection 4.1 discusses a theory of regret aversion based on self-deception.
Then, Subsection 4.2 shows that the model is consistent with intuitive behavior that Eliaz and
Spiegler (2006) have shown to be incompatible with Caplin and Leahys (2001) Psychological
Expected Utility model.
The standard theory of information acquisition under expected utility states that it is
optimal to observe a signal when the value of information (dened as the expected payo¤
gain by observing the signal) is greater than the cost of information. Similarly, I will show
that the DM prefers to observe a signal if the (objective) value of information is greater than
the expected cost of self-deception. In particular, when information has purely hedonic value,
the DM always prefers not to observe any signal.
The objective value of information is dened as the expected payo¤ from observing the
signal:
V  E̂a [E [u (a; ba (̂a) ; ) j̂]]  max
a2A;b2B
Z
u (a; b; ) dF ()  0; (10)
where maxa2A;b2B
R
u (a; b; ) dF () is the expected payo¤ if the DM could not observe ̂a:
Thus, equation (6) implies that the ex-ante expected utility from observing the signal U ()
is equal to
max
a2A;b2B
Z
u (a; b; ) dF () + V   q H (mH (a))  (1  q) L (mL (a)) : (11)
It follows that the DM would prefer to observe the signal if the objective value of in-
formation V is greater than the expected cost of memory manipulation q H (m

H (a
)) +
(1  q) L (mL (a)) :
Proposition 6 (Information Acquisition) Fix a PBE. Let U () denote the expected util-
ity of observing the signal in this PBE and let E [u] denote the expected utility of not observing
the signal. Then, U ()  E [u] = V   q H (mH (a))  (1  q) L (mL (a)) < V:
When information has a purely hedonic value, the objective value of information is V = 0:
In equilibrium, when the a signal is forgotten (̂ = ?), the DM knows that there is a
probability  (mL;m

H) that there was a high signal and 1    (mL;mH) that there was
a low signal. Bayesian updating implies that on average, the only e¤ects of engaging in
self-deception are the manipulation costs  L (m

L) and  H (m

H) : Of course, there is still an
interim incentive to manipulate beliefs after she observes the signal. The inability to commit
not to engage in self-deception leads to a loss in (ex-ante) expected utility :
Corollary 1 When information has purely hedonic value, the DM is strictly better o¤ by
not observing the signal: E [u] > U () : Furthermore, in order to observe the signal, the
individual requires a participation premiumof q H (m

H) + (1  q)  L (mL).
Proposition 6 and Corollary 1 show that memory manipulation leads to the avoidance of
information when individuals have preferences over their own attributes (i.e., they have ego
utility).
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The most standard model of ego utility one could formulate consists of a basic application
of expected utility theory. Let the space of possible attributes  be a non-empty subset of
R and let F (:) denote the agents prior distribution of : The DM has preferences that are
represented by a strictly increasing von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function u : ! R.
In this basic model, if the individual does not observe a signal that is informative about
, her utility is
R
u () dF () : If she observes a signal , the utility conditional on  isR
u () dF (j) :Hence, the expected utility of observing the signal is
R

R
 u () dF (j) dG () ;
where G is the distribution of signals : By the law of iterated expectations, we haveZ
u () dF () =
Z

Z

u () dF (j) dG () ;
so that an individual with perfect memory and who behaves as an expected utility maximizer
is always indi¤erent between observing the signal or not when signals do not a¤ect actions. In
other words, in this standard model of ego utility, the fact that an individual has preferences
over her expected attributes does not inuence her decision of whether to acquire information.
In particular, as in Blackwells theorem, more information cannot hurt the individual.
Note that the result above holds regardless of the shape of the utility function u: In order to
a¤ect the decision of whether to acquire information, the utility function must be a non-linear
function of probabilities. Several models of information acquisition have, thus, assumed that
utility functions are non-linear in probabilities.29 Our model also leads to a utility function
that is non-linear in probabilities. However, the non-linearity arises endogenously through
memory manipulation. Therefore, the present model can be seen as providing a cognitive
foundation for a model of information acquisition.
Proposition 6 shows that the DM will prefer not to collect some information if its objec-
tive value V is lower than the expected costs from memory manipulation q H (m

H (a
)) +
(1  q) L (mL (a)) : In particular, she will always prefer not to observe information that is
informative about her attributes  but does not a¤ect her actions b: For example, people
will prefer not to know the outcome of a medical exam if the value of information is not
su¢ ciently high (e.g. if a detected disease is not treatable) and if the exam has a potentially
large impact on the persons self-image. Dawson et al. (2006) present experimental evidence
supporting this result.30
An immediate consequence of avoiding information correlated with ones skills is the pos-
sible desirability of self-handicappingstrategies such as under-preparing for an examination
or getting too little sleep before a physical exercise (Berglas and Baumeister, 1993). Self-
handicapping strategies reduce the informational content of the signal, and therefore, the
model predicts that a person may engage in such strategies if the expected costs are not too
high.
In several environments, competition allows for more precise information about ones abil-
ities. Thus, individuals may display a fear of competitionand prefer environments where
29For example, Philipson and Posner (1995) and Caplin and Eliaz (2003) analyze the case of testing for
sexually transmitted diseases, K½oszegi (2003) considers a model of patient decision-making, K½oszegi (2006)
studies information acquisition and nancial decisions, and Caplin and Leahy (2004) study strategic infor-
mation transmission. With the exception of Philipson and Posner (1995), who do not provide a justication
for the assumption of a utility function that is non-linear in probabilities, all these papers depart from the
standard expected utility model by adopting the Psychological Expected Utility model.
30Dunning (2005) obtained the same result in the domain of academic ability.
21
outcomes are not directly comparable to the outcomes from other people. More generally, the
model predicts that in environments where information is correlated with ones attributes,
individuals typically face a trade-o¤ between the objective value of information and the costs
of self-deception. Coarser information structures reduce the objective value of information
but cause lower self-deception costs.
4.1 Regret Aversion
In this subsection, I study how the agents utility from the lottery changes as a function of
her prior distribution about her attributes. This allows us to show that the model developed
in this paper provides a formalization for the (informal) theory of regret aversion based on
self-evaluation proposed by Josephs et al. (1992).
The Theory of Regret Aversion based on Self-Perceptions The theory of choice
based on regret aversion was simultaneously proposed by Bell (1982) and Loomes and Sugden
(1982). According to this theory, agents base their decisions not only on expected payo¤s but
also on the payo¤s that they would have obtained if they had made other decisions. Because
agents anticipate feeling regret or delight over their choice, they take this into account when
making a decision.
Josephs et al. (1992) argued that the feeling of regret arises from an individuals self-
evaluation that follows an outcome.31 They suggested that people with worse self-perceptions
are more severely harmed by negative outcomes than those with better self-perceptions.
Therefore, individuals with low self-image would be more likely to make choices that minimize
the possibility of regret.
According to this theory of regret aversion based on self-perception, the premium required
to observe a signal a that is informative about the DMs attributes should be decreasing
in the favorableness of the agents prior distribution (see Figure 8). Denote by U (a) the
expected utility of observing signal a and, as in Proposition 6, let E [u] denote the expected
utility from not observing the signal. Then, the theory predicts that E [u]   U (a) should
be decreasing in the favorableness of the agents prior distribution over her attributes.
The Model Since the theory presented by Josephs et al. (1992) considers only choices
where no ex-post actions are taken, assume that B is a singleton. Moreover, since the ex-
ante decision consists of selecting a gamble, we interpret ex-ante actions a 2 A as a choice
between di¤erent possible lotteries and assume that these actions do not a¤ect the DMs
utility function. The only way in which ex-ante actions a 2 A a¤ect the agents utility is
through the di¤erent distributions associated with each lottery. For simplicity, I consider
either the forgetfulness model of Example 1 or the limited memory model of Example 2.
In order to determine how the agents attitude toward information is a¤ected by her prior,
let  be a parameter that indexes her prior distribution. A higher parameter  leads to a
more favorable prior in the sense of rst-order stochastic dominance:
0 >  =) F
 
;0

 F (;) ; (12)
for all  2 ; with strict inequality for some :
31See also Larrick (1993) for a similar discussion.
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Figure 8: Regret Aversion based on Self-Perceptions
Denote the gain from observing a high signal instead of a low signal by
u (; a) =
Z
u () dF (ja = H;) 
Z
u () dF (ja = L;) :
The assumption that individuals with worse self-perceptions are more severely harmed by
negative outcomes than those with better self-perceptions states can be stated as:
Assumption 3. u (; a) is decreasing in  for all a 2 A:
Recall that U (a) and E [u] were dened as the expected utility of observing signal and
the expected utility from not observing the signal, respectively. Then, the prediction of the
theory of regret aversion based on self-perceptions can be stated as follows:
Conjecture 1 (Josephs et al., 1992) E [u]   U (a) is positive and decreasing in ; for
all a 2 A:
Next, I show that under Assumption 3, the model implies that Conjecture 1 is true. Since
there are no ex-post actions in this model, the only benet from memory manipulation is the
change in the DMs self-perceptions u: Therefore, the amount of memory manipulation is
increasing in the self-image gain from observing a high signalu. Because, under Assumption
3, u (; a) is decreasing in ; we obtain:
Proposition 7 (Regret Aversion) Suppose Assumption 3 holds and consider either the
forgetfulness model of Example 1 or the limited memory model of Example 2. For any a 2 A;
the premium required to observe the signal a is decreasing (in the sense of strong set order)
in the the decision-makers prior over her attributes indexed by parameter .
Therefore, the model provides a formalization of the theory of regret aversion based on
self-perception proposed by Josephs et al. (1992).
23
4.2 Prior-Dependent Attitude Towards Information
Proposition 6 showed that the DM will seek information if its objective value is greater
than the expected costs of self-deception. This result contrasts with Blackwells theorem,
which states that more information cannot be harmful. Alternatively, Caplin and Leahy
(2001) have proposed the Psychological Expected Utility (PEU) model which generalizes the
expected utility model to allow for di¤erent attitudes towards information.
Eliaz and Spiegler (2006) have criticized the PEU model by showing that it is inconsis-
tent with certain situations where a DMs preference for information varies with her prior
distribution. In one example, they describe a patient who prefers more accurate medical
tests when she is relatively certain of being healthy, yet she avoids these tests when she is
relatively certain of being ill. In another example, they describe a manager that asks for
their employeesopinion only when he is su¢ ciently certain that the new information will
not cause her to change her views much. They proved that such behaviors are inconsistent
with the PEU model. As a result, Eliaz and Spiegler have suggested that one should drop
the Bayesian updating assumption.
As the following example shows, the model presented in this paper is consistent with
these two examples described by Eliaz and Spiegler. Therefore, unlike the PEU model, the
self-deception model leads to prior-dependent attitudes toward information while retaining
Bayesian updating.32
Example 3 An individual must choose whether or not to take some medical exam. Let a = E
denote the choice of taking the exam and a = NE denote the choice of not taking it. The
exam is informative about the individuals health  and has outcome  = H if the individual
is healthy and  = L if she is not. If the individual takes the exam, she can undertake medical
treatment B = fT;NTg ; where b = T and b = NT denote the cases where she does and does
not undertake the treatment.
The individuals payo¤ from being healthy is 25: If she takes the medical exam, the in-
dividual has a cost of 5: Thus, her payo¤ conditional on a high signal is 25 if b = T and
20 if b = NT: The agents expected payo¤ conditional on a low signal is  (q) : Undertaking
the treatment can reduce the e¤ects from the disease, which increases her expected payo¤ to
 (q)+1: In order to be consistent with Assumption 3, assume that  (q) is increasing so that
u is decreasing in the DMs prior distribution over her skills (indexed by the probability of
observing a high signal q). Let 
 
1
2

= 10 and  (1) = 20: If the DM does not take the exam,
she obtains an expected payo¤ of 25q +  (q) (1  q) :
For simplicity, let the memory system be given by the forgetfulness model of Example 1
and suppose that memory manipulation is binary: mL 2

 12 ; 0
	
with  L
 
 12

= 3: The
decision problem is depicted in Figure 9.
It is straightforward to show that the agent chooses mL = 0 when q is close to 1: In this
case, since the objective value of information is positive and the cost of self-deception is zero,
the DM always chooses to take the exam. When q = 12 ; however, the DM engages in self-
deception (mL =  12). It can be shown that the expected cost from memory manipulation is
greater than the objective value of information so that the DM prefers not to take the exam.
Thus, unlike Eliaz and Spieglers result on the PEU model, the DM may prefer to take the
32Epstein (2007) presents a model of anticipatory utility. In the special case of rank-dependent expected
utility, they show that their model is also able to accommodate the behavior from Eliaz and Spieglers examples.
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Figure 9: Decision Problem in Example 3
exam when she is relatively certain of being healthy (q  1) but prefer not to take the exam
for intermediate values of q:
5 Lotteries Over Money
We propose that the consequences of each bet include, besides monetary pay-
o¤s, the credit or blame associated with the outcome. Psychic payo¤s of satisfac-
tion or embarrassment can result from self-evaluation or from an evaluation by
others. (Heath and Tversky, 1991, pp. 7-8)
In Section 4, outcomes  2 fH;Lg consisted of purely informative signals, which a¤ected
the DMs utility only through her beliefs about her own attributes . This section considers
outcomes that a¤ect the DMs utility not only by providing information about  but also
directly through monetary payments. I show that the model leads to a theory of ambiguity
aversion based on self-deception. The DM may reject gambles with small but positive ex-
pected value. Moreover, the model is consistent with the competence hypothesis proposed
by Heath and Tversky (1991).
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In order to focus on the implications of the model for the DMs preferences over monetary
lotteries, I take A and B to be singletons so that the agent does not take any actions.
Therefore, as in the model of Subsection 3.4, information has purely hedonic value. However,
in the case of monetary lotteries, outcomes also have a direct e¤ect on the DMs payo¤
through monetary payments.
As described in Section 3, the outcome  2 fL;Hg is interpreted as a monetary payment.
For notational simplicity, I omit a and b from the DMs von Neumann-Morgenstern utility
function. Therefore, in this section, the DMs utility function is denoted by u (; x) ; where
x 2 R denotes the amount of money that she has. If H > L; a high outcome not only provides
favorable information about the agents attributes  but also leads to a higher monetary
payment. This is the natural assumption since, in most cases, the outcome associated with
higher monetary payments is also associated with better attributes. If L > H; a high outcome
provides favorable information about  but provides a lower payment. The results in this
paper hold for any L and H:
For simplicity, I assume that the utility function is additively separable between charac-
teristics and money:
u (; x) = v () +  (x) ;
for a strictly increasing function v : ! R and a function  : R! R: Appendix A analyzes
the general case. Let vs denote the expected payo¤ from attributes conditional on recollection
̂ 2 fH;L;?g :
Under additive separability, monetary payments can be factored out of self 1s memory
manipulation choice. Given an outcome  = s 2 fH;Lg, she maximizes:
(s +ms) vs + (1  s  ms) v? +  (s)   s (ms) :
Therefore, self 1 chooses the same amount of memory manipulation as in the purely hedonic
signals model analyzed in Subsection 3.4. Proposition 4 then implies that the DM will never
choose to remember a low outcome or forget a high outcome:
Corollary 2 Suppose that  s is strictly convex, s 2 fH;Lg : Then, in any PBE, mH > 0 
mL: Furthermore,
vH   vL   0H (1  H) =) mH = 1  H ; mL = 0; and
vH   vL <  0H (1  H) =) 0 < mH < 1  H ; mL < 0:
From equation (6), the DMs ex-ante expected utility is:
U () = q [vH +  (H)   H (mH)] + (1  q) [vL +  (L)   L (mL)] : (13)
It consists of the sum of the expected payo¤ from attributes, the expected monetary payo¤s,
and the expected cost of memory manipulation. Denote by U I the utility of a lottery with the
same distribution over monetary outcomes as the one above but whose monetary outcomes
are uninformative about : Then, the DMs ex-ante expected utility can be written as
U () = U I   q H (mH)  (1  q) L (mL) : (14)
Because the DM takes no actions after observing the outcome (i.e., B is a singleton), infor-
mation has no objective value. Therefore, the model implies that the uninformative lottery
is strictly preferred.
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Remark 2 Consider the entrepreneurship model described in Subsection 3.1. The DM will
choose to become an entrepreneur if the expected monetary payo¤s are greater than the ex-
pected costs of self-deception:
q (H) + (1  q)  (L)  q H (mH) + (1  q) L (mL) :
Baron (1999) presents evidence that individuals who become entrepreneurs nd it easier to
admit past mistakes to themselves. In a static environment, our model may easily lead to this
result. Suppose, for example, that individuals have heterogeneous concerns for self-image or
that homogeneous individuals play di¤erent equilibria of the game. Then those with a lower
concern for self image or those who play equilibria with lower amounts of self-deception are
precisely the ones who benet the most from becoming entrepreneurs. Alternatively, Section
6 will establish that the expected cost of self-deception converges to zero as experience grows.
Therefore, it could be the case that entrepreneurs were not di¤erent from other individuals
ex-ante, but, as they have gained experience, their cost of admitting past mistakes decreased.
Remark 3 Consider the used car model described in Subsection 3.1. The individual will
purchase the car if the expected payo¤ gain from the purchase is greater than the expected
costs of forgetting a bad outcome.
Remark 4 Under the additive separability assumption, it is immediate to extend Proposition
7 to the case of monetary lotteries. Let  index the DMs prior distribution as dened in
equation (12). As in Assumption 3, assume that v () is decreasing in  and consider either
the forgetfulness model of Example 1 or the limited memory model of Example 2. Then, the
premium U I   U () is positive and decreasing (in the sense of strong set order) in .
5.1 Probability Weights
In this subsection, I will consider a non-expected utility representation, where the decision-
makers expected utility from observing the signal is expressed as a weighted average of the
utility in each state of the world  2 fL;Hg : The representation consists of a weighting
function w : [0; 1]! R such that the utility from participating in the lottery is
U () = w (q) uH + [1  w (q)] uL;
where us 
R
u (; s) dF (j = s) ; s 2 fH;Lg. Clearly, the decision maker is an expected
utility maximizer if w (q) = q. Although the model does not feature ambiguity in the sense
of an imprecise distribution of probabilities, I will follow the literature on decision-making
under ambiguity and say that an agent is ambiguity averse if w (q) < q.33
Proposition 8 shows that the ex-ante preferences of the DM can be represented by a
non-expected utility and that the DM always displays ambiguity aversion when the outcomes
from the lottery are informative about her attributes:34
33 If we identify unambiguous lotteries as those whose outcomes are uninformative about the DMs at-
tributes and follow the approach in Epstein (1999), it follows that the DM is ambiguity averse if and only if
w (q) < q:
34Note that the model of monetary lotteries becomes a model of purely hedonic signals (Subsection 3.4) when
 (H) =  (L) : Thus, when information has purely hedonic value, the DMs expected utility from observing
the signal can be represented by
U () = w (q)uH + [1  w (q)]uL;
where w (q) = q   q H(m

H)+(1 q) L(m

L)
uH uL
: Furthermore: w (0) = 0; w (1) = 1; and w (q) < q for all q 2 (0; 1) :
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Proposition 8 (Representation) The DMs expected utility from the monetary lottery can
be represented by
U () = w (q)uH + [1  w (q)]uL; (15)
where
w (q) = q   q H (m

H) + (1  q) L (mL)
uH   uL
: (16)
Furthermore, w (0) = 0; w (1) = 1; and w (q) < q for all q 2 (0; 1) :
Remark 5 Note that the representation from equation (15) is not separable between probabil-
ities and the utility us: Since the departure from linear probability weights is caused by memory
manipulation, individuals who engage in more memory manipulation have lower probability
weights w (q) : Furthermore, because the amount of memory manipulation is increasing in the
marginal utility from attributes, it follows that the deviation from linear weighting is itself a
function of us:
5.2 Discussion
The model presented here implies that ambiguity aversion is a consequence of the lottery
outcomes being informative about the DMs attributes. Several experimental papers have
related ambiguity aversion with the lotteries being inuenced by an individuals skill or
knowledge.35 First, some experiments have contradicted the idea that ambiguity aversion
is related to the imprecision of the probability distribution of the events as is usually ar-
gued. Budescu, Weinberg, and Wallsten (1988), for example, compared decisions based on
numerically, graphically (the shaded area in a circle), and verbally expressed probabilities.
Numerical descriptions of a probability are less vague than graphic descriptions which, in
turn, are less vague than verbal descriptions. Thus, if agents had a preference for more pre-
cise distributions, they should rank events whose probabilities have a numerical description
rst, graphic descriptions second, and verbal descriptions last. However, unlike ambiguity
aversion would predict, subjects were indi¤erent between these lotteries. Indeed, the authors
could not reject that the agents behaved according to subjective expected utility theory and
weighted events linearly.36
Heath and Tversky argued that peoples preferences over ambiguous events arise from the
anticipation of feeling knowledgeable or competent.37 Their interpretation of the Ellsberg
paradox is as follows:
People do not like to bet on the unknown box, we suggest, because there is
information, namely the proportion of red and green balls in the box, that is
knowable in principle but unknown to them. The presence of such data makes
people feel less knowledgeable and less competent and reduces the attractiveness
of the corresponding bet. (Heath and Tversky, 1991, pp. 8)
35See Goodie and Young (2007) for a detailed discussion of this literature.
36See also Budescu et al. (2002).
37Subsection 5.4 denes Heath and Tverskys competence hypothesis more precisely and also briey
reviews the empirical evidence related to it.
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Fox and Tversky (1995, pp. 585) proposed that ambiguity is caused by comparative
ignorance. They have argued that ambiguity aversion is produced by a comparison with
less ambiguous events or with more knowledgeable individuals.As in Heath and Tverskys
(1991) competence hypothesis, this comparative ignorance hypothesisstates that ambiguity
aversion is driven by the feeling of incompetence. Similarly, Goodie (2003) proposed the
perceived control hypothesis, according to which ambiguity aversion is generated by an agents
belief that the distribution of outcomes is inuenced by attributes such as knowledge or skill.38
As will be shown in Section 6, it is straightforward to embed the model in a dynamic
setting where the DM updates beliefs according to Bayesrule. Therefore, the model provides
a tractable framework where individuals display ambiguity aversion and still follow Bayes
rule. Under the self-perception reinterpretation of ambiguity aversion, the di¢ culties in
characterizing an updating rule under ambiguity do not arise.39
5.3 Small-Stakes Risk Aversion
This subsection considers lotteries with small monetary stakes. It is shown that memory ma-
nipulation leads the DM to exhibit zeroth-orderrisk aversion, which has important implica-
tions. Standard expected utility maximizers exhibit second-order risk aversion. An individual
with second-order risk aversion always accepts small gambles with positive expected value.
Then, if the agent has reasonable levels of risk aversion with respect to lotteries with small
stakes, she must display unrealistically high levels of risk aversion with respect to lotteries
with large stakes (Samuelson, 1963; Rabin, 2000).
Segal and Spivak (1990) show that an individual with rst-order risk aversion rejects
small gambles as long as the positive expected value is su¢ ciently small. Therefore, several
nonexpected utility models that feature rst-order risk aversion have been proposed. How-
ever, Safra and Segal (2008) show that the inability to simultaneously explain an agents risk
aversion over lotteries with small stakes and lotteries with large stakes can be generalized to
non-expected utility models.40 In this subsection, I show that the model allows us to reconcile
risk aversion with respect to small lotteries with sensible levels of risk aversion with respect
to large lotteries.41
Consider the lottery described previously. The certainty equivalent of the lottery is dened
by the monetary amount CE 2 R that makes the agent indi¤erent between participating in
the lottery or receiving CE for sure:Z
u (; CE) dF () = quH (H) + (1  q)uL (L)  q H (mH)  (1  q) H (mL) : (17)
The risk premium associated with a lottery is dened as the di¤erence between the expected
payment and the certainty equivalent:  = qH + (1  q)L  CE:
38There is a large experimental literature on the e¤ect of perceived control on risk-taking (c.f., Chau and
Phillips, 1995, or Horswill and McKenna, 1999).
39See, for example, Hanany and Kilbano¤ (2007).
40The crucial assumption in Segal and Spivak (1990) is that decision-makers have a unique preference
relation over nal-wealth distributions. Hence, their framework does not include gain-losses models such as
Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992).
41Fudenberg and Levine (2007) present a dual-self model of dynamic consumption where the agents exercise
of self-control may also lead to risk aversion over lotteries with small stakes.
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Let s 2 fH;Lg be a binary random variable such that E [s] = qH + (1  q)L = 0:
Consider a lottery that pays x = "s; where " > 0: A decision maker has risk preferences of
second order if lim"!0+  (") =" = 0: She is rst-order risk averse if lim"!0+  (") =" > 0 is
nite. She is zeroth-order risk averse if lim"!0+  (") =" = +1:
Note that the monetary lottery converges to a model of purely hedonic signals as " ap-
proaches zero. Then, as shown in Corollary 1, the DM demands a strictly positive participa-
tion premium in order to observe the signal. Hence, the certainty equivalent of the lottery
converges to CE (0) < 0 and
lim
"!0+
 (")
"
=   lim
"!0+
CE (")
"
= +1:
Thus, the individual exhibits zeroth-order risk aversion. This result is established formally
in the following proposition:
Proposition 9 (Zeroth-Order Risk Aversion) In any PBE, the DM exhibits zeroth-order
risk aversion.
Since outcomes are informative about the DMs attributes, the DM engages in memory
manipulation. Therefore, even when the monetary payo¤s converge to zero, she still demands
a strictly positive risk premium. Hence, the individual displays zeroth-order risk aversion and
displays risk aversion for lotteries with small stakes. However, as shown in Corollary 1, when
the expected monetary stakes are larger than the DMs participation premium, she will accept
to participate in the lottery. Thus, as the following example shows, the DM may be risk averse
over lotteries with small stakes without displaying an unreasonable degree of risk aversion
over lotteries with large stakes:
Example 4 (Safra and Segal, 2008) Suppose an agent rejects a lottery that pays either
 100 or 105 with equal probability at all wealth levels below 300; 000. Safra and Segal show
that all standard non-expected utility models imply that this agent cannot accept a lottery that
pays  5; 000 or 10; 000; 000 with equal probability for some wealth level below 300; 000. The
model is this paper, however, is consistent with this behavior. Indeed, I will show that the
DM may even accept the second lottery for all wealth levels below 300; 000.
Suppose both lotteries have the same informational content about the DMs attributes :
For simplicity, take the forgetfulness model of Example 1 with binary manipulation e¤orts
mL 2

 12 ; 0
	
and let  (x) = x for all x 2 R. Suppose that 13 (vH   vL) >  L
 
 12

so that
self 1 engages in memory manipulation: mL =  m: Then, the DM rejects the rst lottery
and accepts the second lottery for all wealth levels below 300; 000 if
1
2
(vL +W   100) +
1
2
(vH +W + 105) 
1
2
 L

 1
2

<
1
2
vL +
1
2
vH +W; and
1
2
(vL +W   5000) +
1
2
(vH +W + 1000000) 
1
2
 L

 1
2

>
1
2
vL +
1
2
vH +W
for all W  300; 000: These conditions are satised if
5 <  L

 1
2

< min

1
3
(vH   vL) ; 995; 000

: (18)
Therefore, when inequality (18) is satised, the DM accepts the rst lottery and rejects the
second lottery for all wealth levels below 300; 000.
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Figure 10: Experimental Results on the Competence Hypothesis
5.4 The Competence Hypothesis
Consider two lotteries with the same distribution over monetary outcomes. In the rst
lottery, outcomes are informative about the decision-makers skills or knowledge whereas in
the second they are not. If the information about ones skills or knowledge is not useful
(i.e., the objective value of information from the rst lottery is zero) and the individual is
an expected utility maximizer, she should be indi¤erent between these lotteries. Since ones
attributes are ambiguous, an ambiguity averse individual should prefer the lottery whose
outcomes are uninformative about her skills or knowledge.
Heath and Tversky (1991) have studied this choice in a series of experiments. They have
shown that people prefer the skill- or knowledge-dependent lottery in contexts where they feel
knowledgeable or competent but prefer the skill- or knowledge-independent lottery in ones
where they consider themselves ignorant or uninformed. In one experiment, for example,
subjects were asked to answer several questions. Subjects also revealed (in an incentive-
compatible way) their expected probability of answering the questions correctly. Afterwards,
they chose between betting on their answers or participating in a lottery with the same
expected probability of winning. The proportion of people who chose to bet on their answers
is presented in Figure 10.
If decision-makers are expected utility maximizers and the value of information is zero,
they should be indi¤erent between these two lotteries. Since Prospect Theory does not dis-
tinguish between sources of uncertainty in the specication of probability weighting function,
it also predicts that people should be indi¤erent between these two lotteries. Therefore, in
both cases, the proportion of individuals who bet on the knowledge-based lottery should be
roughly constant at 50% when the value of information is zero. If the value of information
is positive, individuals who behave according to either Expected Utility Theory or Prospect
theory should prefer the knowledge-based lottery. Hence, in this case, the proportion of
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Figure 11: Simulated Results on the Competence Hypothesis
individuals who bet on the knowledge-based lottery should be constant at 100%.42
Heath and Tversky found a remarkably di¤erent pattern. The proportion of people who
preferred to bet on the knowledge-based lottery instead of a knowledge-independent lottery
with the same expected probability of winning was increasing in the judged probability.43 In
situations where the expected probability of winning was small, people preferred to bet on
the knowledge-independent lottery. On the other hand, when the expected probability of
winning was large, individuals preferred to bet on the knowledge-based lottery. This result
was labeled the Competence Hypothesis.
The following examples show that our model is consistent with the Competence Hypoth-
esis:
Example 5 Consider the forgetfulness model of Example 1. For simplicity, let memory
manipulation be a binary variable mL 2

 23 ; 0
	
; with  L
 
 23

= 14 and  L (0) = 0: Suppose
that the DM does not face any ex-ante choice. However, in order to have a positive objective
value of information, suppose that she chooses between a low bL and a high bH action ex-post.
Let vs (b) denote the expected payo¤ from attributes conditional on outcome s 2 fH;Lg
and take the following payo¤s:
vH (bH) = 6; vH (bL) = 5; vL (bL) = 1; vL (bH) = 0;  (H) = 1;  (L) = 0:
In Appendix D, I show that the DM prefers the attribute-dependent lottery if q > 1123 and
prefers the attribute-independent lottery if q < 1123 :
42Under the assumption that deviations from linear weighting are generated by the lottery being inuenced
by the DMs knowledge or skill (e.g., Heath and Tversky, 1991, and Fox and Tversky, 1995), this pattern is also
inconsistent with standard probability weighting functions that overweight small probabilities and underweight
large probabilities (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992, and Prelec, 1998).
43A number of other experiments have conrmed the predictions of the competence hypothesis (c.f., Keppe
and Weber, 1995; Taylor, 1995; Kilka and Weber, 2000; Chow and Sarin, 2001; Fox and Weber, 2002; Kue-
hberger and Perner, 2003; Di Mauro, 2008).
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Example 6 Take the same parameters from the previous example but suppose that mem-
ory manipulation is a binary variable mL 2 f  m; 0g ; where the parameter m is distributed
according to a c.d.f.  on

1
3 ; 1

. Suppose that q  14 so that the objective value of infor-
mation is positive.44 In Appendix D, I show that the proportion of people who prefer the
attribute-dependent lottery is:
0 if q 2

1
4
;
7
19

;


3
4
  1  2q
1  q

if q 2

7
19
;
1
2

;


3
4

if q 2

1
2
; 1

:
Therefore, consistent with the Competence Hypothesis, this proportion in increasing in q:
Figure 11 depicts the case where m is uniformly distributed.
6 Practice makes perfect: The Repeated Model
The previous sections considered a decision-maker who observes an outcome once and makes
inferences about her attributes based on her recollection of this outcome. In several situa-
tions, however, individuals participate in this process repeatedly. A professional investor, for
example, is constantly deciding which investment to undertake and receives feedback about
the success or failure of these investments very frequently. It is often argued that the biases
in decision-making that we observe in experimental settings would be severely attenuated as
individuals gain experience. This section presents a repeated version of the general model
described in Section 3 and shows that this is indeed the case in this model. More precisely, I
show that the behavior of the DM converges to the one predicted by expected utility theory
as the number of observed signals grows.
Consider a repeated version of the general model described in Section 3. For simplicity,
I assume that A is a singleton so the DM only chooses actions after observing the signal.45
In each period n 2 f1; 2; 3; :::; Ng, an independent draw of the signal n 2 fH;Lg is made.
Each signal n is observed with probabilities Pr ( = Hj) and Pr ( = Lj), where  is the
agents trueattributes. The parameter  is not known. Instead, the DM has a prior F ()
about its distribution. Hence, the prior over the distribution of a signal n is
Pr (n = s) =
Z
Pr (n = sj) dF () s 2 fH;Lg ;
where the conditional probability Pr ( = Hj) is strictly increasing in :
After observing n 2 fH;Lg ; the DM engages in memory manipulation mL and mH . She
recollects a signal ̂n 2 fH;L;?g : A history at time n is a sequence of recollected signals
and actions:
hn 1 = ((̂1; :::; ̂n 1) ; (b1; :::; bn 1)) 2 Hn 1;
44 If q < 1
4
; then b (̂) = bL for all ̂: Therefore, since actions are not a function of recollections, the objective
value of information is zero.
45See Remark 6.
33
where Hn 1  f?; L;Hgn 1Bn 1 is the set of possible histories. Note that, in this model,
the DM can only manipulate the recollection of a signal in the time that the signal occurred.
After the recollection has been registered into the agents memory, she can no longer distort
it.46
As in the static game, the agents choice is modeled through a di¤erent self acting each
time information is forgotten. Thus, in each period, a stage-1 self chooses memory manip-
ulations (mH;n;mL;n) : Hn 1 ! [ H ; 1  H ]  [ L; 1  L] to maximize the discounted
sum of payo¤s from all future stage-games. The discount rate is  2 [0; 1): Then, a stage-2
self applies Bayesrule and chooses an action bn : f?; L;Hg  Hn 1 ! B. For notational
clarity, I omit the arguments from the proles of actions and manipulations.47
Denition 2 A PBE of the game is a strategy prole (b;mH ;m

L) and posterior beliefs
 (:j:) such that:
1. ms;n maximizes
(s +ms)

E

u (; bn; s) j
 
s; b (s) ;hn 1

+ V
 
s; b (s) ;hn 1
	
+ (1  s  ms)

E

u (; bn; s) j
 
?; b (?) ;hn 1

+ V
 
?; b (?) ;hn 1
	
   s (ms)
with respect to ms; s 2 fH;Lg :
2. bn 2 argmaxb2B

E

u (; b; s) jŝ; hn 1

+ V
 
ŝ; b;hn 1
	
; for s 2 fH;Lg and ŝ 2
fH;L;?g :
3.  (:jh) is obtained by Bayesrule if Pr

hjmL;n;mH;n

> 0; for all h 2 Hn[f?; L;Hg
Hn 1;
4. The continuation payo¤ V satises, for all
 
ŝ; b;hn 1

2 Hn;
V
 
ŝ; b;hn 1

= E
8<:
NX
z=n+1
z n
24 u (; bz; z)  Pr (z = H) H mH;z
 Pr (z = L) L

mL;z
 35  ŝ; b; hn 1
9=; :
I am interested in the PBE of the game when N is large for a xed  2 [0; 1). Let ̂n (hn)
denote the Bayes estimator of  given history hn
̂n (h
n) 
Z
dF (jhn) :
Note that F (jhn) is a function of mH and mL:
I assume that H > 0 and that there exists some m >  L with  L ( m)  sup fu (b; ; )g 
inf fu (b; ; )g for all b; :48 This assumption ensures that the DM never forgets a signal
46This assumption captures the psychological nding that most information loss occurs soon after it is
obtained. Nevertheless, it is clearly an extreme assumption. In general, forgetting rates seem to follow a
power law (Anderson, 1995). Therefore, a large fraction of the information is lost right after learning, and
over time, the rate of forgetting slows down.
47Thus, we write bn instead of b

n
 
̂n; h
n 1, and m;n instead of m;n  ; hn 1 :
48This is satised, for example, if limmL! L  (mL) = +1:
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n 2 fH;Lg with probability 1:49 The rst issue is whether the Bayes estimator of  is con-
sistent. In other words, does the DM eventually learn her true attributes after observing a
su¢ ciently large number of signals?
If memory manipulation were constant, the answer would be immediate because in this
case, the recollections would be i.i.d., and hence Doobs Consistency theorem would imply
that ̂n (hn) converges to : This is formally stated in the following lemma:
Lemma 1 Suppose mH;n
 
hn 1

= ~mH and mL;n
 
hn 1

= ~mL for all hn 1; n and let N !
1: Then ̂n !  for almost all histories.
When memory manipulation is endogenous, however, it is not immediate that the DM
eventually learns her true type. Although observed signals n are i.i.d., memory manipu-
lation leads to non-independent and non-identically distributed recollections ̂n. However,
because the agent knows the equilibrium strategies, she knows the probability of each signal
conditional on the recollection. Therefore, intuitively, the agent correctly updates the recol-
lections and eventually learns her true type regardless of how much manipulation e¤ort she
exerts.
The following result will be used in order to show that this intuition is correct:
Lemma 2 For any xed history hn; F (jhn;mH ;mL) is increasing in mH and decreasing in
mL:
The lemma above implies that, conditional on reaching each history, the agent always
prefers that she had forgotten high signals and remembered low signals. Because the agent
is ultimately concerned about n, F (jhn;mH ;mL) is not a function of mH and mL in all
histories that do not contain any ̂n = ?. However, whenever the agent recollects ̂n = ?; she
is always better o¤ when she forgets high signals and remembers low signals (since it reduces
the probability of arriving at ̂n = ? after a low signal n = L). Hence, (jhn; H ; 1  L)
rst-order stochastically dominates (jhn;mH ;mL) for all mH ;mL:50
A straightforward implication of Lemma 2 is that:
E [jhn; 1  H ; m]  E [jhn;mH ;mL]  E [jhn; H ; 1  L] ; (19)
for allmH andmL  m and all histories hn: But because Lemma 1 implies that both extremes
in the inequality (19) converge to , it thus follows that the term in the middle converges
and has limit : This result is formally stated in the following proposition:51
49Either one of these conditions are needed to ensure identication. If H = 0 and mL (h
n) = L; then
mH (h
n) = 0 for all hn would imply that ̂n = ?: In this case, the Bayesian posterior would be equal to the
prior and, therefore, there is no hope for the Bayes estimator to be consistent. This assumption is not satised
in the model of Example 3.4.1 (H > 0 is violated). However, it is straightforward to adjust the arguments
from this section to establish the same results for that model.
50The rst-order dominance (FOSD) is for xed hn: Since the probability of each history is itself a function
of mL and mH , it does not follow that there is unconditional FOSD.
51Note that the probability of occurence of a history Pr (hn) is a function of the sequence of memory
manipulations mH and mL: Because H > 0 and  L ( m)  sup fu (b; ; )g   inf fu (b; ; )g for some
m >  L; the sets of histories with zero measuse is the same for all relevant manipulation e¤orts: mH (hn) 2
[ H ; 1  H ] and mL (hn) 2 [ L; m] : Therefore, we omit any explicit reference to mL and mH when
considering almost sure convergence of ̂n (hn).
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Proposition 10 (Consistency) Let N !1: Then, ̂n !  for almost all histories.
Proposition 10 shows that, regardless of the memory manipulation employed by the DM,
she eventually learns her true attributes : Thus, the benet of memory manipulation con-
verges to zero, and therefore, memory manipulation converges to zero as the number of
observed signals increases:
Proposition 11 (No Manipulation in the Long Run) Let N ! 1: Then, mH;n ! 0
and mL;n ! 0 for almost all histories.
Suppose signals are purely informative. As in Section 4, omit the signal  from the agents
utility function. Dene the optimal action bO () 2 B as the one that maximizes the agents
utility when her attributes  are known: bO () 2 argmaxb2B u (b; ) : Proposition 11 implies
that bn ! bO for almost all histories. Therefore, in the limit, the DM chooses the same
actions as an expected utility maximizer who knows .
Consider the case of monetary lotteries, and as in Section 5, omit the actions from the
utility function. The DMs ex-ante utility from observing an additional signal converges to
qu (H; ) + (1  q)u (L; ) ; which is the same utility of an expected utility maximizer when
the attributes  are known.
Therefore, when signals are observed frequently enough, agents will not engage in self-
deception and their behavior will converge to the behavior of standard expected utility max-
imizers. This is consistent with the usual intuition that people do not exhibit ambiguity
aversion over frequently observed events or that experts are subject to much less biases (e.g.
List, 2003, List and Haigh, 2003).52
Remark 6 In the preceding analysis, we have assumed that A is a singleton so that the DM
does not take actions that a¤ect the distribution of the signals a. This assumption simplies
the notation and the proofs. It is not important for our results as long as the rst-order
stochastic dominance assumption (equation 1) is retained. Thus, as long as all signals a 2 A
are informative about ; the DM eventually learns her true attributes and does not engage in
memory manipulation.
If the agent has the choice of not observing any signal (see, for example, Subsections 7.1
and 7.2), then she may choose never to obtain any information about : In that case, her
expected attributes would not converge.
7 Applications
This section presents two applications of the model. The rst application provides a self-
deception model of the endowment e¤ect. The second application provides a self-deception
rationale for people taking sunk investments into consideration when making decisions.
52List (2003) also showed that experienced traders of sports paraphernalia show smaller endowment e¤ects
for everyday goods used in lab studies than novice traders. This result is also consistent with the model above
if the ability to trade sports paraphernalia is correlated with the ability to trade other goods.
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7.1 The Endowment E¤ect
An individual that satises the axioms of expected utility theory does not display a di¤er-
ence between the maximum willingness to pay for a good and the minimum compensation de-
manded to sell the same good (willingness to accept) when income e¤ects are small. However,
several empirical works have documented a discrepancy between these values. An individual
tends to value one good more when the good becomes part of that persons endowment.
Thaler (1980) labeled this phenomenon an endowment e¤ect.
Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1990) argued that the endowment e¤ect was caused by
loss aversion.53 This subsection proposes an alternative explanation for the endowment e¤ect.
The main idea is that, in most markets, trading requires certain skills or knowledge. At the
very least, the parties must form an expectation of how much each good is worth. In more
complex markets, they must also estimate the future prices of the goods (which determine
the opportunity cost of trading). Therefore, as in the used car example (Subsection 3.1) the
outcome from the trade reveals information about how skillful the person is.
As we have seen previously, an individual that cares about her self-image and is subject
to imperfect memory will engage in an activity that reveals information about her skills only
if the objective value of information is greater than the expected memory cost. Therefore,
she may prefer not to trade if the price is only slightly above the expected value of the good.
The model is a special case of the general framework described in Section 3. Let a 2
fT;NTg denote the DMs choice of whether or not to trade an object. Let  denote the
gain from trade (in monetary terms), which is unknown by the agent. Trading leads to an
outcome  2 fH;Lg ; which a¤ects the DMs utility both directly through the gain from
trade  and indirectly because it is informative about the DMs skills : After observing the
outcome ; the DM engages in memory manipulation mL (T ) and mH (T ) : As in Section 5,
let the DMs preferences over skills  and money x be represented by v () +  (x) and, with
no loss of generality, normalize the monetary payo¤ from not trading to zero ( (0) = 0).
Equation (13) implies that the DM will prefer to trade if the expected gain from trade is
greater than the expected memory cost:
q (H) + (1  q)  (L)  q H (mH (T )) + (1  q) L (mL (T )) :
Therefore, we have the following result:
Proposition 12 (Endowment E¤ect) There exist 1  2 > 0 such that:
1. the DM agrees to trade in any PBE if E [ ()]  1;
2. the DM refuses to trade in any PBE if E [ ()]  2;
3. there exist PBE where the DM agrees to trade and PBE where the DM refuses to trade
if 1 > E [ ()] > 2:
In particular, a risk neutral individual will demand a strictly positive premium in order
to trade. A risk averse individual will demand an even greater premium.
53According to loss aversion, losses are weighed substantially more than gains. Then, the cost of losing a
good is much higher than the benet of winning a good.
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A standard explanation based on ambiguity aversion would argue that the object initially
owned by the DM has a less ambiguous distribution than the other object. Therefore, an
ambiguity averse agent would not agree to trade if the expected gain from trade is not
su¢ ciently high. Recall from Subsection 5.1 that the self-deception model relates the degree
of ambiguity aversion with the DMs attributes. Thus, in the present model, the endowment
e¤ect is due to the self-evaluation that follows trade. Since the outcome of the trade is
informative about the agents skills or knowledge and therefore leads to costly self-deception,
the DM may require some strictly positive premium in order to trade.
7.2 Sunk Cost E¤ects
The consequences of any single decision (...) can have implications about the
utility of previous choices as well as determine future events or outcomes. This
means that sunk costs may not be sunk psychologically but may enter into future
decisions. (Staw, 1981, pp. 578)
Standard decision theory shows that only incremental costs and benets should inuence
decisions. Historical costs, which have already been sunk, should be irrelevant. However,
evidence suggests that people often take sunk costs into account when making decisions.54
Genesove and Mayer (2001), for example, studied the Boston housing market. They have
shown that when expected prices fall below a the original purchase price, sellers set an asking
price that exceeds the asking price of other sellers by between 25 and 35 percent of the
di¤erence.
In a eld experiment, Arkes and Blumer (1985) randomly selected sixty people to buy
season tickets to the Ohio University Theater and divided them in three groups of twenty.
Patrons in the rst group paid the full price ($15). Those in the second group received a
$2 discount, and people in the last group received a $7 discount. Patrons in the rst group
attended signicantly more than those in the discount groups.
This subsection shows that the self-deception model leads to sunk-cost e¤ects. Psychol-
ogists have long argued that self-deception may be an important cause of why sunk costs
a¤ect choice. For example, Staw (1976) has shown that being personally responsible for an
ine¢ cient investment is an important factor in choosing to persist on it. Brockner et al.
(1986) have documented that persisting on an ine¢ cient allocation of resources is increased
when subjects are told that outcomes reected their perceptual abilities and mathematical
reasoning.55
Whether previous investments succeed or fail has important e¤ects on the decision makers
self-views. Then, as the opening quote suggests, a past choice may be associated with not
simply sunk monetary costs but also real psychological costs. Abandoning a project usually
involves admitting that a wrong decision was made. Therefore, an individual revising her
position in the project reveals information about her skills or knowledge. As shown in Section
4, the DM will prefer to avoid such information if the cost of making an uninformed decision
is not high enough. But, in this case, some projects with negative expected value will not be
terminated.
54Sunk costs e¤ects are also called irrational escalation of commitment, the entrapment e¤ect, or too
much invested to quit.
55See Brockner (1992) for a review of the literature.
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Figure 12: Timing of the model
The model is a special case of the general framework described in Section 3. As in Section
5, I assume the DMs utility function is additively separable over attributes  and money x:
For simplicity, I also assume that the DM is risk neutral so that u (; x) = v () + x:
The timing of the model is presented in Figure 12. First, the DM chooses whether to invest
in a project that costs K > 0 and gives a random monetary payo¤ of . Let a0 2 fI;NIg
denote the investment choice, where a0 = I if the DM undertakes the investment and a0 = NI
if she does not. After the sunk investment was made, the DM can reevaluate the value of
the project at zero cost. Let a1 = E denote the case where DM reevaluates the project
and a1 = NE otherwise. Reevaluating the project leads to a (purely informative) signal
 2 fH;Lg : A high signal is good news, both about the protability of the project  and
about the DMs skills .
After observing the signal ; the DM may engage in memory manipulation mL and mH
which leads to a recollection ̂ 2 fH;L;?g : Then, she chooses whether or not to abort the
project. I write b = A if the project is aborted and b = C if it is continued. If the project is
aborted, the DM obtains a monetary payo¤ of 0: If it is not aborted, the DM has an expected
monetary payo¤ conditional on signal s 2 fH;Lg of s:
I assume that the project is ex-ante e¢ cient E [] > 0:56 As was shown in Propo-
sition 6, the agent will prefer to observe the signal  if the objective value of informa-
tion, V =   (1  q)L > 0; is greater than the expected manipulation costs, q H (mH) +
(1  q) L (mL) > 0. Hence, if the loss from not aborting after a low signal are not too
large,the DM will prefer not to reevaluate the project:
Proposition 13 (Sunk Cost E¤ect) There exist 1  2 < 0 such that:
1. the DM reevaluates the project in any PBE if L  1;
2. the DM does not reevaluate the project in any PBE if L  2; and
3. there exist PBE where the DM reevaluates the project and the DM doesnt reevaluate
the project if 1 < L < 2:
Since reevaluating ones previous decision is informative about the persons skills or knowl-
edge, it leads to self-deception. Therefore, the DM will prefer not to reevaluate her initial
choice if the monetary loss L from continuing an ine¢ cient project is lower than the ex-
pected cost of memory manipulation. Note that the key feature of the model is not the
psychological cost from failure itself. The individual will eventually nd out whether the
56 If the project is ex-ante ine¢ cient, E []  0, the problem would be trivial since the DM would never
invest.
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project is successful or not. However, by not reevaluating a project, the individual avoids the
psychological cost from self-deception.57
8 Conclusion
This paper proposed a model of choice under risk based on imperfect memory and self-
deception. The model provides a unied explanation for a number of biases in decision-
making. It also leads to non-expected utility representation that is consistent with recent
experimental evidence relating ambiguity aversion to an individuals skills or knowledge.
The model can be enriched in several directions by incorporating strategic components.
Principal-agent relationships seem like a natural application of the theory. Since the outcome
of the relationship is typically informative about the agents skill or knowledge, principals may
prefer to o¤er contracts that do not completely reveal the outcome to the agent. Therefore,
rms may prefer not to condition wages on economy-wide shocks. Similarly, CEOs may be
rewarded for luck.
Another interesting direction is in the eld of incomplete contracts. Contracts may be
incomplete due to the contracting parties preferences for avoiding information correlated
with their skills or knowledge.58 However, because parties understand the consequences of
contract forms and post-contractual decisions, the allocation of rights may matter for the
outcomes. Therefore, the general framework proposed here may provide a behavioral model
for a theory of ownership based on incomplete contracts.
The model can also be embedded in a general equilibrium model. Since self-deception
leads to endowment e¤ects, the model may provide an explanation for the low volume of
trades of uncertain assets occurring in equilibrium.59
Finally, the model can lead to interesting predictions when  is interpreted as a parameter
of anticipatory utility. Because anticipatory utility typically leads to a rst-order gain from
memory manipulation but only second-order costs through suboptimal decision-making, in-
dividuals will forget negative news and remember positive news with probability above their
natural rates. For example, a model of portfolio allocation where signals  are informative
about the protability of a risky asset may provide an explanation for why most investors hold
extremely underdiversied portfolios and overinvest in stocks issued by the their employing
rm.
Appendix A Non-Separable Preferences
In Section 5, the DMs preferences were assumed to be additively separable between attributes
and money. In this section, I consider general utility functions. It turns out that a main feature
in this general model is the degree of complementarity between attributes and money. As will be
discussed later, since a DM is not as a¤ected by monetary outcomes when she is uninformed about
her attributes when attributes and money are complementary, complementarity can be interpreted
57The argument above is related to agency explanations. For example, as argued by Li (2007), in environ-
ments with adverse selection, agents may prefer not to change their opinions if this publicly conceals bad news
about their abilities. It is unclear, however, whether agency concerns would play an important role in contexts
where the decisions are not publicly observed.
58Mukerji (1998) showed that ambiguity aversion may lead to incomplete contracts. Tirole (2008) considered
a model where thinking about contingencies is costly. In his model, contracts may be too complete.
59See Billot et al. (2000) for a model based on ambiguity aversion.
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as providing psychological insurance. Therefore, the DM may prefer a lottery whose outcomes
are informative about her attributes if the complementarity e¤ect is greater than the costs of self-
deception. Moreover, the resulting probability weighting function may have an inverted S-shapeas
in Tversky and Kahneman (1992) and Prelec (1998).
Let u (s) 
R
u (; s) dF (j) denote the expected utility from a monetary amount equal to s
conditional on outcome : As in Corollary 2, it can be shown that, in any PBE, mH > 0  mL:60
Dene the degree of complementarity between  and money by
 (H;L)  uH (H) + uL (L)  uL (H)  uH (L) : (20)
Note that  (H;L)  0 if u has increasing di¤erences and  (H;L)  0 if u has decreasing di¤erences.
The additively separable case presented in the text corresponds to the case where  (H;L) = 0: The
ex-ante expected utility from the lottery is
U () = q (H +m

H)uH (H) + (1  q) (L +mL)uL (L)
+q (1  H  mH)u? (H) + (1  q) (1  L  mL)u? (L) MC;
where MC = q H (m

H) + (1  q) H (mL) is the expected memory cost. Then, long but tedious
algebraic manipulations yield
U () = quH (H) + (1  q)uL (L) + z (H;L) MC: (21)
where z = q(1 q)(1 L m

L)(1 H m

H)
q(1 H mH)+(1 q)(1 L mL)
> 0 and MC = q H (m

H) + (1  q) H (mL) :
The utility of a monetary lottery can be decomposed in three terms: First, the expected utility
quH (H) + (1  q)uL (L) of the lottery when memory is perfect. Second, the expected manipulation
costs MC: These two e¤ects are precisely the same as in the additively separable case (see equation
13). The third e¤ect, which is not present when the utility is additively separable, is the degree
of complementarity between attributes and money. When signals are forgotten, there is probability
 (mH ;m

L) that a high signal was observed and the complementary probability that a low signal was
observed. Thus, forgetting a signal can be seen as providing psychological insuranceto the agent.
This raises her expected utility if  and money are complementary ( > 0) and decreases her expected
utility if they are substitutes ( < 0).
Proceeding as in Subsection 5.1, it follows that the DMs expected utility can be represented by
U () = w (q) uH (H) + [1  w (q)] uL (L) ;
where w (q) = q+ z(H;L) MCuH(H) uL(L) : Moreover, it is straightforward to show that w (0) = 0; and w (1) = 1:
Therefore, when attributes and money are complementary, the DM may exhibit ambiguity loving
behavior. In particular, the following example shows that the model may lead to an inverted S-shaped
probability weighting function:
Example 7 (Inverted S-shaped Probability Weighting Function) Consider the limited mem-
ory model of Example 2 and suppose that the manipulation e¤ort is a binary variable: mH 2

0; 34
	
;
where  H
 
3
4

= 15 . Let  (H;L) = uH (H)   uH (L) = 1: Then, self 1 chooses to engage in mem-
ory manipulation if q 2
 
0; 1112

: It is straightforward to show that, for values of q such that the DM
engages in memory manipulation, the probability weighting function has an inverted S-shape:
w (q)

> q if q 2
 
0; 12

< q if q 2
 
1
2 ;
11
12
 :
60As in Corollary 2, it can also be shown that
uH (H)  uL (L)   0H (1  H) =) m

H = 1  H ; m

L = 0; and
uH (H)  uL (L) <  0H (1  H) =) 0 < m

H < 1  H ; m

L < 0:
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As in Section 5, denote by U I the utility of a lottery with the same distribution over monetary
outcomes as the one above but whose monetary outcomes are uninformative about : Rearranging
equation (21), we obtain
U () = U I + y (H;L) MC; (22)
where y = q (1  q)

1 +
(1 L mL)(1 H m

H)
q(1 H mH)+(1 q)(1 L mL)

> 0: Consider the choice between the lottery 
and another lottery with the same distribution over monetary outcomes but whose monetary outcomes
are uninformative about . Equation (22) implies that the DM will prefer lottery  if the degree
of complementarity is high enough or if the expected memory cost is low enough: y (H;L)  MC:
Therefore, when attributes and money are complementary, the DMmay prefer the attribute-dependent
lottery.
However, when the monetary lottery is small(i.e., when the lottery pays x = "s for " low), the
complementarity e¤ect vanishes. Since the memory cost converges to a strictly positive number as
" converges to zero, it follows that the certainty equivalent of the lottery converges to CE (0) < 0.
Therefore,
lim
"!0+
 (")
"
=   lim
"!0+
CE (")
"
= +1
and, for any degree of complementarity between attributes and money, the DM always exhibits zeroth-
order risk aversion. This is formally stated in the following proposition:
Proposition 14 In any PBE, the DM exhibits zeroth-order risk aversion.
It is interesting to contrast the general model with the a model from the following example where
the DM does not face memory costs:
Example 8 (Exogenous Memory Model) Take  s (ms) = +1 for all ms 6= 0: Thus, the agent
cannot engage in endogenous memory manipulation. Let s < 1 so that the agent forgets outcome
with (exogenous) probabilities 1  s > 0: If H > L; memory is selective in the sense that good news
is more likely to be remembered than bad news.
When memory manipulation is endogenous (and di¤erentiable at ms = 0), the e¤ect from memory
manipulation always dominates the complementarity e¤ects and the DM displays zeroth-order risk
aversion. When memory manipulation is exogenous, the order of risk aversion is determined by the
degree of complementarity between attributes and money. Note that for small "; attributes and money
are complementary if u0H (0) < u
0
L (0) and substitutes if u
0
H (0) > u
0
L (0).
Proposition 15 In the exogenous memory model: (i) the DM is rst-order risk averse if u0L (0) >
u0H (0) ; (ii) the DM is rst-order risk seeking if u
0
L (0) < u
0
H (0) ; and (iii) the DM has second-order
risk preferences if u0L (0) = u
0
H (0) :
Therefore, the DM may display risk preferences of rst order when there are no manipulation
costs. Unlike when memory manipulation is endogenous, the DM may be rst-order risk seeking or
have risk preferences of second order.
Appendix B Non-Bayesian Framework
Throughout the paper, I have maintained the assumption that the DM understands that she
engages in memory manipulation and, thus, interprets her recollections according to Bayes rule.
Therefore, in the model presented in the text, individuals are sophisticated. In this section, I consider
the case of naive individuals. As in Mullainathan (2002), naive individuals are unaware of their
imperfect memory and interpret recollections as if they were the true outcomes. Two interesting
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features arise under naiveté. First, unlike the model of sophisticated individuals, the equilibrium is
unique. Second, decision makers may prefer to observe a signal even if it has no objective value. As a
consequence, they may display ambiguity seeking behavior even under additive separability between
attributes and money. Moreover, the individual may exhibit zeroth-order risk seeking behavior.
Consider a naive decision maker (NDM), who is unaware of her memory manipulation e¤orts.
Therefore, she applies Bayesrule as if her recollections were generated by the memory system when
she does not engage in memory manipulation, i.e. mL = mH = 0: When ̂ 2 fH;Lg ; she correctly
infers that outcome  = ̂ has been observed in period 1: However, when an outcome is forgotten, she
attributes weight
  q (1  H)
q (1  H) + (1  q) (1  L)
(23)
to a high outcome and (1  ) to a low outcome. I refer to such updating rule as naive Bayesrule.
The following denition proposes an adaptation of the PBE concept to naive decision makers:
Denition 3 A Perfect Naively Bayesian Equilibrium (PNBE) of the game is a strategy prole
(a; b;mH (a) ;m

L (a)) and posterior beliefs  (:j̂a) such that:
1. a 2 argmax
a2A

E̂a [E [u (a; b

a (̂a) ; ; a) j̂a] jmL (a) ;mH (a)]
 q H (mH (a))  (1  q) L (mL (a))

;
2. ms (a) 2 argmax
ms

(s +ms)E [u (a; b

a (̂a) ; ; s) j̂a = s]
+ (1  s  ms)E [u (a; ba (̂a) ; ; s) j̂a = ?]   s (ms)

;
s 2 fH;Lg;
3. ba (̂) 2 argmax
b2B
fE [u (a; b; ; a) j̂a = ̂]g ;
4.  (j̂a = ̂) is obtained by naive Bayesrule if Pr (̂a = ̂jmL = mH = 0) > 0; 8̂ 2 fL;H;?g.
Conditions 1 3 are the same as in the PBE concept. Condition 4 modies the standard Bayesian
condition by requiring agents to follow the naive Bayes rule instead.
An interesting special case of this naive framework is obtained when we take the forgetfulness
memory system of Example 1. Recall that if the state ? is interpreted as a recollection of a high
outcome, then the model from Example 1 becomes one where the agent is able to convince herself
that a low outcome was a high outcome by engaging in memory manipulation. Suppose an individual
recollects a high outcome (i.e., ̂ = ?). If this individual is sophisticated, she then corrects for her
memory imperfection and attributes some (Bayesian) weight to the possibility that she has observed a
low outcome but managed to convince herself that the outcome was high instead. On the other hand,
a naive individual believes her recollection is correct and attributes full weight to a high outcome
( = 1).
B1 Equilibrium Uniqueness
This subsection establishes that a PNBE exists and, under mild conditions, is unique. The naive
updating rule implies that the NDMs expected utility given ̂ = ? is
u? (a; b; ) = uH (a; b; ) + (1  )uL (a; b; ) : (24)
Upon observing an outcome s 2 fH;Lg ; self 1 maximizes:
(s +ms)us (a; ba (s) ; s) + (1  s  ms)u? (a; ba (?) ; s)   s (ms) : (25)
The key feature of the naive updating rule is that it is not a function of the amount of memory manip-
ulation employed by self 1: This greatly simplies the computation of the PNBE of the model since,
unlike in the sophisticated case, there is no feedback between self 2s expectation of the manipulation
exerted by self 1 and self 1s manipulation choice. Then, the equilibrium amount of manipulation is
determined by the maximum of expression (25).
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Proposition 16 There exists a PNBE. Furthermore, if  s is strictly convex and ba (ŝ) is a (single-
valued) function where s 2 fH;Lg and ŝ 2 fH;L;?g, the PNBE is essentially unique.61
Proof. Existence follows the same argument as Proposition 1. Note that Condition 3 from Denition
3 implies that ba (ŝ) is not a function of self 1s memory manipulation. Strict convexity of  s implies
that expression (25) is strictly concave in ms: Then, the equilibrium amounts of memory manipulation
mL and m

H are unique. Condition 4 implies that beliefs must also coincide in all recollections such
that Pr (̂a = ̂jmL = mH = 0) > 0:
Corollary 3 The PNBE is essentially unique when either: (i) u (a; :; ; a) : B ! R is a strictly
concave function, or (ii) B is a singleton (i.e., the individual does not take ex-post actions).
Remark 7 Suppose that B is nite and x the natural rates of remembering an outcome L and H .
Since the set of utility functions u : ABR! R such that argmax
b2B
fE [u (a; b; ; a) j̂a = ̂]g
contains more than one element is nowhere dense, it follows that the PNBE is essentially unique for
generic utility functions when the set of ex-post actions B is nite.
The generic uniqueness of the PNBE contrasts with the multiplicity of the PBE discussed in
Subsubsection 3.4.2. Multiplicity arises from the fact that self 1 a¤ects self 2s equilibrium inference
when the individual is sophisticated. In the naive case, because there is not e¤ect from memory
manipulation on self 2s inference, uniqueness is obtained.
B2 Ambiguity-Seeking Behavior
For simplicity, consider the forgetfulness memory system of Example 1 and, as in the Section 5,
assume that the utility is additively separable between attributes and money. Then, the equilibrium
amount of memory manipulation is mL = min
n
 0
 1
L (u) ; 1
o
: The ex-ante expected utility of the
NDM is
U () = (1  q) (1 +mL)uL + [q   (1  q)mL]u?   (1  q) L (mL)
= (1  q) (1 +mL)uL + [q   (1  q)mL]uH   (1  q) L (mL) ;
where the second inequality uses the fact that u? = uH : The NDM prefers to observe the signal 
if and only if the expected improvement in self-image jmLju is greater than the cost of memory
manipulation  L (m

L) :
62 Thus, naive individuals may prefer to observe signals even if the objective
value of information (which in this case is zero) is lower than the expected costs of manipulation.
Remark 8 Proceeding as in Proposition 8, it follows that the NDMs expected utility from the mon-
etary lottery can be represented by
U () = w (q)uH + [1  w (q)]uL;
where w (q) = q   (1  q)
h
mL +
 L(m

L)
u
i
; w (0) = 0; and w (1) = 1: Thus, the NDM is ambiguity
averse if jmLju <  L (mL) and ambiguity seeking if the reverse inequality is satised. Hence, a
naive individual may be ambiguity seeking even when the utility function is additively separable between
attributes and money.
61The PNBE is essentially unique in the sense that, all PNBE feature the same choices of actions a and
b; manipulation e¤orts mL and mH ; and beliefs given recollections that are believed to be reached with
positive probability (i.e., (̂a = ̂jmL = mH = 0) > 0). Equilibria may diverge only with respect to beliefs
at recollections that are not believed to be reached with positive probability. Obviously, one can ensure
uniqueness of beliefs in all recollections by assuming that the NDM believes that all recollections are reached
with positive probability: 0 < min fH ; Lg < 1:
62As in Subsection 4.1, the NDMs surplus from observing a signal is decreasing in the favorableness of her
prior distribution over her attributes under Assumption 3. However, unlike Conjecture 1, this surplus may be
positive when the individual is naive.
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B3 Zeroth-Order Risk Seeking Behavior
This subsection shows that the NDM may be zeroth-order risk seeking. As in Subsection 5.3,
consider a lottery that pays x = "s; s 2 fH;Lg ; where qH + (1  q)L = 0: Let ms (") denote the
equilibrium amount of memory manipulation as a function of ". The certainty equivalent of this
lottery is:Z
u (; CE (")) dF () = (1  q) (1 +mL ("))uL (L)
+ [q   (1  q)mL (")]uH (H)  (1  q) L (mL ("))  q H (mH (")) ;
Recall that u (s) 
R
u (; s) dF (j)us () = v+ (s) ; where the last equality follows from additive
separability. Then, taking the limit as "! 0+; we obtain:
 (CE (0)) =  mL (1  q)v   (1  q) L (mL)  q H (mH) :
Hence, CE (0) > 0 if jmL (0)j (vH   vL) >  L (mL (0))+
q
1 q H (m

L (0)) and the NDM is zeroth-order
risk seeking. In the opposite case, the NDM is zeroth-order risk averse. Thus, we have established
the following result:
Proposition 17 The NDM is:
 zeroth-order risk averse if jmL (0)j (vH   vL) <  L (mL (0)) +
q
1 q H (m

L (0)) ; and
 zeroth-order risk seeking if jmL (0)j (vH   vL) >  L (mL (0)) +
q
1 q H (m

L (0)) :
Appendix C Finite Number of Realizations
In the main text, we assume that each outcome a may be either high or low. It is straightforward
to generalize this framework to allow for any nite number of possible outcomes. Suppose that, given
action a 2 A; an outcome a 2 f1; 2; :::; Sag is realized, Sa  2: Outcomes are ordered by rst-order
stochastic dominance:
F (ja = s)  F (ja = s+ 1)
for all  2 , s 2 f1; 2; :::; Sag and a 2 A; with strict inequality for some value of :
An outcome s 2 f1; 2; :::; Sag is remembered with probability s;a+ms; where s;a 2 [0; 1] : Self 1
exerts memory manipulation ms 2

 s;a; 1  s;a

, which costs  s (ms)  0: Then, self 2 observes a
recollection of the outcome a; which is denoted by ̂a 2 f1; 2; :::; Sa;?g and takes an action b 2 B:
Preferences are represented by a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function u : ABR! R
which is strictly increasing in . When u (; a; b; x) = u (; a; b; y) for all x; y 2 R; the model has purely
informative signals. If signals are purely informative and A and B are singletons, we say that they
have a purely hedonic value. When u (; a; b; x) 6= u (; a; b; y) for some x; y 2 R we say that the model
has monetary signals.
It is straightforward to generalize the results in the text to this framework. For the representation
result of Proposition 8, however, one should note that probability weights are no longer unique when
Sa > 2.
Entrepreneurship Example The performance s 2 fS; Fg of an entrepreneur is a¤ected by two
independent variables: her attributes  and the external conditions r 2 f1; 2; 3; :::; Rg. Attributes
and external conditions are substitutes for the entrepreneurs performance. Therefore, given her
performance s 2 fS; Fg, more favorable external conditions r provide bad news about the agents
attributes (in the sense of rst-order stochastic dominance). The individual always recollects her
performance s, but may manipulate her memory in order to change the rate at which she remembers
the external conditions r:
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This situation is modeled as follows. Let  2 fS; Fgf1; :::; Rg denote the outcome of the project.
Outcomes are ordered by rst-order stochastic dominance:
(S; 1) FOSD (S; 2) FOSD ::: FOSD (S;R) FOSD (F; 1) FOSD ::: FOSD (F;R) ;
where we write x FOSD y if x rst-order stochastically dominates y: Given an outcome (s; r) ; self
1 chooses the probability at which the external conditions r are forgotten by exerting manipulation
e¤ort ms;r: Then, self 2 applies Bayesrule to the recollections (s; r̂) ; where r̂ 2 fr;?g : The agents
payo¤ net of manipulation costs given a recollection (s; r̂) is
E [v (; s) js; r̂] +  (s) ;
where s 2 fS; Fg and r̂ 2 f1; 2; :::; R;?g : Figure 13 presents the agents decision tree.
Figure 13: Entrepreneur Example
It is straightforward to extend the results from the general framework to this environment. In
particular, expected manipulation costs are always strictly positive. Therefore, the agent will require
the expected monetary payo¤s from starting a new company to be strictly higher than the payo¤ from
the previous job in order to become an entrepreneur. Moreover, if all outcomes have the same natural
rate of recollection (i.e., s;r =  for all s; r), then ms;1  ms;2  :::  ms;R with at least one strict
inequality, s 2 fS; Fg : Hence, the agent will remember negative external conditions more frequently
than positive ones.
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Appendix D Proofs
D1 Proofs of Propositions and Lemmas
Proof of Proposition 1: Dene m̂L (mL;mH) and m̂H (mL;mH) as the set of maxima of (4)
and (5), respectively (these are the best-response correspondences of self 1). Since (4) and (5) are
continuous and concave functions dened over a compact set, m̂L (mL;mH) and m̂H (mL;mH) are
non-empty, convex, and compact sets. Dene the transformation T : [ L; 1  L] [ H ; 1  H ]!
[ L; 1  L]  [ H ; 1  H ] by T (mL;mH) = (m̂L (mL;mH) ; m̂H (mL;mH)) : Then, Kakutanis
theorem establishes that there exists a xed-point of T which is a PBE. 
Proof of Proposition 2: The proof will use the following result:
Claim A1. uH (a; ba (?) ; L) > uL (a; ba (L) ; L) :
Proof of the claim. By revealed preference, u? (a; ba (?) ; L)  u? (a; ba (L) ; L) : From the denition
of u?;
uH (a; b (?) ; L) + (1  )uL (a; b (?) ; L)  uH (a; b (L) ; L) + (1  )uL (a; b (L) ; L) ;
where I omit the e¤orts mH and mL from  (mH ;mL) for notational clarity. Rearranging, gives
 [uH (a; ba (?) ; L)  uH (a; ba (L) ; L)]  (1  ) [uL (a; ba (L) ; L)  uL (a; ba (?) ; L)] :
Then, revealed preference implies that
uH (a; ba (?) ; L)  uH (a; ba (L) ; L) 
1  

[uL (a; ba (L) ; L)  uL (a; ba (?) ; L)]  0:
Thus, uH (a; ba (?) ; L)  uH (a; ba (L) ; L) : But, rst-order stochastic dominance implies that uH (a; ba (L) ; L) >
uL (a; ba (L) ; L) : Therefore, we have that uH (a; ba (?) ; L) > uL (a; ba (L) ; L) : 
Proof of Proposition 2: Because H < 1; the set of strictly positive e¤orts given a high signal
(0; 1  H ] is nonempty. Since (5) is strictly concave, it su¢ ces to show that its derivative evaluated
at mH = 0 is strictly positive:
uH (a; b (H) ;H)  uL (a; b (?) ;H)   (mL (a) ;mH (a)) [uH (a; b (?) ;H)  uL (a; b (?) ;H)] > 0;
(26)
for all mL (a) ;m

H (a) ; where I have used the fact that  
0
H (0) = 0:
Note that, by revealed preference, uH (a; b (H) ;H)  uH (a; b (?) ;H) : Hence,
uH (a; b (H))  uL (a; b (?))
uH (a; b (?))  uL (a; b (?))
 1:
Rearranging, we obtain:
uH (a; b (H) ;H)  uL (a; b (?) ;H)   (mL (a) ;mH (a)) [uH (a; b (?) ;H)  uL (a; b (?) ;H)]
 uH (a; b (H) ;H)  uL (a; b (?) ;H)  [uH (a; b (?) ;H)  uL (a; b (?) ;H)]  0:
This shows that the expression on the left-hand side of (26) is non-negative. Suppose it is equal
to zero. Then, by the previous inequality, it must be the case that  (mL (a) ;m

H (a)) = 1: But
 (mL (a) ;m

H (a)) = 1 implies that m

L = 1   L which, from the Kuhn-Tucker condition of the
maximization of (4), requires that
uL (a; ba (L) ; L)  uH (a; ba (?) ; L)   0L (1  L)  0:
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But, from Claim A1, uL (a; ba (L) ; L)  uH (a; ba (?) ; L) < 0; which contradicts the inequality above.
Hence, mH (a) > 0 for all a 2 A. 
Proof of Proposition 3: Dene the function Ws as the expected utility of self 1 conditional on
 = s :
Ws (mL;mH ; a; fbag) =
(1  s  ms) [ (mL;mH)uH (a; ba (?) ;H) + [1   (mL;mH)]uL (a; ba (?) ; L)]
+ (s +ms)us (a; ba (s) ; s)   s (ms)
:
For notational clarity, I omit the term a from ms (a) : In any PBE, m

s solves:
max
ms

(1  s  ms) [ (mL;mH)uH (a; ba (?) ;H) + [1   (mL;mH)]uL (a; ba (?) ; L)]
+ (s +ms)us (a; ba (s) ; s)   s (ms)

:
Therefore, the envelope theorem implies that
@Ws
@mL
mL=mL
mH=m

H
= (1  s  ms) [uH (a; ba (?) ;H)  uL (a; ba (?) ; L)]
@ (mL;m

H)
@ms
: (27)
The DMs ex-ante utility is equal to
U (mH ;mL; a; fbag) = qWH (mL;mH ; a; fbag) + (1  q)WL (mL;mH ; a; fbag)
Thus,
@U (mH ;mL; a; fbag)
@ms
mH=mH
mL=m

L
= q
@WH (m

H (a) ;m

L (a) ; a)
@ms
+ (1  q) @WL (m

H (a) ;m

L (a) ; a)
@ms
:
Since @(mH ;mL)@mH  0 
@(mH ;mL)
@mL
with at least one inequality being strict, equation (27) yields
@U (mH ;mL; a; fbag)
@mH
< 0 <
@U (mH ;mL; a; fbag)
@mL
:
Then, the result follows from the concavity of U . 
Proof of Proposition 4: From Proposition 2, it follows that mH (a) > 0: First, we establish that
mL (a)  0. By the strict concavity of equation (4), it su¢ ces to show that its derivative evaluated
at mL = 0 is weakly negative:
  (mL (a) ;mH (a)) (uH   uL)   0L (0)| {z }
0
 0;
which is true because  (mL (a) ;m

H (a))  0 and uH > uL.
From Kuhn-Tuckers conditions of the maximization of (4), there exists a PBE with mL = 0 if
and only if
 (0;mH (a)) (uH   uL) = 0;
for some mH (a) that maximizes (5) given m

L (a) = 0:
Because uH > uL; this is satised if and only if  (0;mH (a)) = 0. But  (0;m

H (a)) = 0 implies
that mH = 1   H : From Kuhn-Tuckers conditions of the maximization of (5), there exists a PBE
with mH = 1  H if and only if
(uH   uL) [1   (mL (a) ;mH (a))]   0H (1  H) ;
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for some mL that maximizes (4). Substituting  (m

L (a) ;m

H (a)) = 0; it follows that (uH   uL) 
 0H (1  H) : 
Proof of Proposition 5: Existence follows from Proposition 2. For a xed mL; self 1 solves:
max
 1mL0
uL  mL (mL; 0)u   L (mL) :
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions are:
 (mL; 0)u    0L ( 1) =) mL =  1;
 (mL; 0)u  0 =) mL = 0; and
0 <  (mL; 0)u <   0L ( 1) =)  (mL; 0)u =   0L (mL) :
In the PBE, mL = mL: Substituting  (mL; 0) =
q
q (1 q)mL and using the implicit function theorem,
it follows that the unique PBE has manipulation e¤orts:
mL =  1 if u   
 0L ( 1)
q
; and
q
q   (1  q)mL
u =   0L (mL) if u <  
 0L ( 1)
q
:
The rst claim follows by inspection. Let the cost of manipulation be  L (mL; ) ; where 
parametrizes the marginal cost of memory manipulation: @
2 
@mL@
< 0: Therefore, higher s lead to a
higher marginal cost of memory manipulation ( mL  0). Then, di¤erentiation of the condition (8)
and an inspection of the condition for boundary equilibria establishes the second and third claims.

Proof of Proposition 6: Follows from equations (10) and (11). 
Proof of Proposition 7: First, consider the forgetfulness model. From Corollary 1,
E [u]  U (a) = (1  qa) L (mL (a))  0:
Then, Proposition 5 implies that the amount of manipulation jmLj is increasing in u. Since, by
Assumption 3, u (; a) is decreasing in  for any a; it follows that E [u] U (a) is decreasing in :
Consider the limited memory model. From Corollary 1,
E [u]  U (a) = qa H (mH (a))  0:
It can be shown that the set of equilibrium manipulations is increasing in the benet of manipulation
u (in the sense of strong set order). Then, Assumption 3 and the monotonicity of  H (mH) in
mH  0 imply that the set of equilibrium premia fE [u]  U (a)g is decreasing in  (in the sense of
strong set order). 
Proof of Proposition 8: The representation follows equations (13) and (15). Note that q = 0
implies that, in any PBE, mL = 0: Thus, w (0) = 0: Similarly, in any PBE, q = 1 implies m

H = 0
and, therefore, w (1) = 1: 
Proof of Proposition 9: This is a special case of Proposition 14. 
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Proof of Lemma 1: Note that in this case recollections are i.i.d. Then, in order to apply Doobs
consistency theorem, we need to check that there exists a set A 2 f?; L;Hg such that 1 6= 2 =)
Pr1 (A) 6= Pr2 (A) : In each period, the probability of each recollection ̂ (which are i.i.d.) is
Pr (̂ = Hj) = Pr ( = Hj) H ;
Pr (̂ = Lj) = [1  Pr ( = Hj)] L;
Pr (̂ = ?j) = Pr ( = Hj) (1  H) + [1  Pr ( = Hj)] (1  L) :
Since Pr ( = Hj) is strictly increasing in ; it follows that 1 > 2 implies Pr1 (̂ = H) > Pr2 (̂ = H)
and Pr1 (̂ = L) < Pr2 (̂ = L) ; which veries the condition. 
Proof of Lemma 2: To simplify the notation, consider the distribution of q instead of the distribution
of : This is without loss of generality since q = Pr ( = Hj) is strictly increasing in : With some
abuse of notation, I will write F (qjhn) for the c.d.f. of q given history hn:
Note that actions bn 2 B are functions of the sequence of recollections f̂1; :::; ̂ng : Therefore, to
simplify notation and with no loss of generality, I omit the actions fb1; b2; :::; bng from histories. Thus,
with some abuse of notation, I will refer to a history as a sequence of recollections hn = f̂1; :::; ̂ng
in all the proofs in the appendix.
Denote by hnnk the history f̂1; :::; ̂k 1; ̂k+1; :::; ̂ng : I will use the following result:
Claim A2. For any history hn; we have:
F

qjhnnk; ̂k = H

 F

qjhnnk; ̂k = L

:
This claim states that, for any history, a high signal is good news about q and a low signal is bad
news about q in terms of rst-order stochastic dominance.
Note that the p.d.f. conditional on hn is
f (qjhn) =
Y
t:t=?

q
 
1  H  mH;t

+ (1  q)
 
1  L  mL;t


Y
t:t=H
q
 
H +m

H;t


Y
t:t=L
(1  q)
 
L +m

L;t

 f (q)
R 8>><>>:
Y
t:t=?

q
 
1  H  mH;t

+ (1  q)
 
1  L  mL;t


Y
t:t=H
q
 
H +m

H;t


Y
t:t=L
(1  q)
 
L +m

L;t

 f (q)
9>>=>>; dq
:
Let #H denote the number of times that a signal ̂ = H was recollected: # ft : ̂t = Hg : Similarly,
dene #L as # ft : ̂t = Lg :63 Then, after some algebraic manipulations, we can write:
f (qjhn) =
Y
t:t=?

q
 
1  H  mH;t

+ (1  q)
 
1  L  mL;t

 q#H  (1  q)#L  f (q)
R Y
t:t=?
h
q

1  H  mH;t

+ (1  q)

1  L  mL;t
i
 q#H  (1  q)#L  f (q) dq
:
Note that f (qjhn) is not a function of mH;t and mL;t for any history hn such that ̂t 6= ?: This follows
from the signals t being i.i.d. and the fact that ̂t = t when ̂t 6= ?: Integrating the equation above,
we obtain
F (xjhn) =
R x
0
Y
t:t=?

q
 
1  H  mH;t

+ (1  q)
 
1  L  mL;t

 q#H  (1  q)#L  f (q) dq
R 1
0
Y
t:t=?
h
q

1  H  mH;t

+ (1  q)

1  L  mL;t
i
 q#H  (1  q)#L  f (q) dq
:
63Obviously, #H and #L are functions of histories. We omit this dependence for notational clarity.
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We are now ready to prove the Claim:
Proof of Claim A2.We have to show thatR x
0
Y
t:t=?

q
 
1  H  mH;t

+ (1  q)
 
1  L  mL;t

 q#H  (1  q)#L  f (q) dq
R 1
0
Y
t:t=?
h
q

1  H  mH;t

+ (1  q)

1  L  mL;t
i
 q#H  (1  q)#L  f (q) dq

R x
0
Y
t:t=?

q
 
1  H  mH;t

+ (1  q)
 
1  L  mL;t

 q#H 1  (1  q)#L+1  f (q) dq
R 1
0
Y
t:t=?
h
q

1  H  mH;t

+ (1  q)

1  L  mL;t
i
 q#H 1  (1  q)#L+1  f (q) dq
:
When x = 0; both sides become 0 and, when x = 1; both sides are equal to 1:
The derivative of the LHS with respect to x isY
t:t=?

x
 
1  H  mH;t

+ (1  x)
 
1  L  mL;t

 x#H  (1  x)#L  f (x)
R 1
0
Y
t:t=?
h
q

1  H  mH;t

+ (1  q)

1  L  mL;t
i
 q#H  (1  q)#L  f (q) dq
;
and the derivative of the RHS with respect to x isY
t:t=?

x
 
1  H  mH;t

+ (1  x)
 
1  L  mL;t

 x#H 1  (1  x)#L+1  f (x)
R 1
0
Y
t:t=?
h
q

1  H  mH;t

+ (1  q)

1  L  mL;t
i
 q#H 1  (1  q)#L+1  f (q) dq
:
Note that dRHSdq >
dLHS
dq if and only ifY
t:t=?

x
 
1  H  mH;t

+ (1  x)
 
1  L  mL;t

 x#H  (1  x)#L  f (x)
R 1
0
Y
t:t=?
h
q

1  H  mH;t

+ (1  q)

1  L  mL;t
i
 q#H  (1  q)#L  f (q) dq

Y
t:t=?

x
 
1  H  mH;t

+ (1  x)
 
1  L  mL;t

 x#H 1  (1  x)#L+1  f (x)
R 1
0
Y
t:t=?
h
q

1  H  mH;t

+ (1  q)

1  L  mL;t
i
 q#H 1  (1  q)#L+1  f (q) dq
:
Rearranging, we obtain:
xR 1
0
Y
t:t=?
h
q

1  H  mH;t

+ (1  q)

1  L  mL;t
i
 q#H  (1  q)#L  f (q) dq
 (1  x)R 1
0
Y
t:t=?
h
q

1  H  mH;t

+ (1  q)

1  L  mL;t
i
 q#H 1  (1  q)#L+1  f (q) dq
:
Thus, dRHSdq >
dLHS
dq if and only if
 (x) >
R 1
0
Y
t:t=?

q
 
1  H  mH;t

+ (1  q)
 
1  L  mL;t

 q#H  (1  q)#L  f (q) dq
R 1
0
Y
t:t=?
h
q

1  H  mH;t

+ (1  q)

1  L  mL;t
i
 q#H 1  (1  q)#L+1  f (q) dq
;
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where  (x) = x1 x : Since  (0) = 0;  (1) = +1;  (x) is strictly increasing in x; and the term on the
right is a positive constant, there exists a unique x such that
 (x) > (<)
R 1
0
Y
t:t=?

q
 
1  H  mH;t

+ (1  q)
 
1  L  mL;t

 q#H  (1  q)#L  f (q) dq
R 1
0
Y
t:t=?
h
q

1  H  mH;t

+ (1  q)

1  L  mL;t
i
 q#H 1  (1  q)#L+1  f (q) dq
;
if x < (>) x:
Therefore, we have thatdRHSdq >
dLHS
dq if x < x and
dRHS
dq <
dLHS
dq if x > x: Thus, the inequality
is satised for all q (it is satised with strict inequality whenever q 2 (0; 1) and with equality at
q 2 f0; 1g. 
Now, we are ready to prove the lemma:
Proof of Lemma 2. As shown previously, F (xjhn) is not a function of mL;k and mH;k for k such
that ̂k 6= ?: Therefore, we only need to establish the results for k such that ̂k = ?:
Consider an arbitrary k such that ̂k = ?: Then, F (xjhn) is equal to
1  H  mH;k
 R x
0
q#H+1 (1  q)#L
Y
t6=k:t=?

q
 
1  H  mH;t

+ (1  q)
 
1  L  mL;t

f (q) dq
+

1  L  mL;k
 R x
0
q#H (1  q)#L+1
Y
t6=k:t=?

q
 
1  H  mH;t

+ (1  q)
 
1  L  mL;t

f (q) dq
1  H  mH;k
 R 1
0
q#H+1 (1  q)#L
Y
t6=k:t=?

q
 
1  H  mH;t

+ (1  q)
 
1  L  mL;t

f (q) dq
+

1  L  mL;k
 R 1
0
q#H (1  q)#L+1
Y
t6=k:t=?

q
 
1  H  mH;t

+ (1  q)
 
1  L  mL;t

f (q) dq
:
With some algebraic manipulations, it follows that dFdmH;k (xjh
n) > 0 if and only ifR x
0
q#H (1  q)#L+1
Y
t6=k:t=?

q
 
1  H  mH;t

+ (1  q)
 
1  L  mL;t

f (q) dq
R 1
0
q#H (1  q)#L+1
Y
t6=k:t=?
h
q

1  H  mH;t

+ (1  q)

1  L  mL;t
i
f (q) dq
>
R x
0
q#H+1 (1  q)#L
Y
t6=k:t=?

q
 
1  H  mH;t

+ (1  q)
 
1  L  mL;t

f (q) dq
R 1
0
q#H+1 (1  q)#L
Y
t6=k:t=?
h
q

1  H  mH;t

+ (1  q)

1  L  mL;t
i
f (q) dq
Note that the left-hand side is equal to F (xjhn; ̂n+1 = L) ; whereas the right-hand side is equal to
F (xjhn; ̂n+1 = H) : From the previous claim, it follows that F (xjhn; ̂n+1 = L)  F (xjhn; ̂n+1 = H) ;
which proves that the condition above is satised. Therefore, we have shown that dFdmH;k
(xjhn) > 0.
The argument for dFdmL;k
(xjhn) < 0 is analogous. 
Proof of Proposition 10: The result is immediate from inequality 19, Lemma 1, and the fact that
the sets of histories with zero measure are the same for all relevant manipulation e¤orts. 
Proof of Proposition 11: In period N; conditions 1 and 2 from the denition of a PBE state that
mL;N
 
L; hN 1

2 argmax
mL
(L +mL)
Z
u () dF
 
jL; hN 1

+(1  L  mL)
Z
u () dF
 
j?; hN 1

  L (mL) ;
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and
mL;N
 
H;hN 1

2 argmax
mH

(H +mH)
R
u () dF
 
jH;hN 1

+(1  H  mH)
R
u () dF
 
j?; hN 1

   H (mH)

:
From Proposition 10, it follows that
R
u () dF
 
jhN

converges to u () for almost all histories.
But, when
R
u () dF
 
jhN

= u () ; it follows that mL
 
L; hN 1

maximizes
(L +mL)u () + (1  L  mL)u ()   L (mL) = u ()   L (mL) ;
which has a global maximum at mL = 0: Hence, by continuity, it follows that mL
 
L; hN 1

! 0
(a.s.). Similarly, when
R
u () dF
 
jhN

= u () ; mH
 
H;hn 1

maximizes u ()    H (mH) so that
mH
 
H;hn 1

! 0 (a.s.). 
Proof of Proposition 12: Given  = s; self 1 maximizes
(s +ms) (s + s) + (1  s  ms) [H + (1  ) L + s]   s (ms) ;
where  =  (mL;m

H) : Simplifying, this expression becomes:
(s +ms) s + (1  s  ms) [H + (1  ) L] + s    s (ms) :
Therefore, the solution of the maximization program of self 1 is independent of s: It thus follows the
set of manipulation e¤orts ms (T ) that are part of a PBE is the same for all L and H ; s 2 fH;Lg :
The self 1 chooses a = T if
qH + (1  q)L  q H (mH (T )) + (1  q) L (mL (T )) :
The result then follows from the fact that the left-hand side is not a function of H and L: 
Proof of Proposition 13: The expected utility of self 1 if she chooses (I;NE) is q (H + H) +
(1  q) (L + L) : Her expected utility if she chooses NI is qH (1  q) L: Because qH+(1  q)L >
0; it follows that NI is never chosen.
If self 1 chooses (I; E) ; she obtains:
q (H + H) + (1  q) L   q H (mH)  (1  q) L (mL) :
Therefore, (I; E) is chosen if
q (H + H) + (1  q) L   q H (mH)  (1  q) L (mL)  q (H + H) + (1  q) (L + L) :
Rearranging, we obtain
  (1  q)L  q H (mH) + (1  q) L (mL) : (28)
Proceeding as in the proof of Proposition 12, it can be shown that the set of manipulation e¤orts
ms (I; E) that are part of a PBE is the same for all L and H ; s 2 fH;Lg : Then, the result follows
immediately from equation (28). 
Proof of Proposition 14: For any PBE, dene the expected manipulation cost as MC (") 
q H (m

H (")) + (1  q) H (mL (")) : Note that lim"!0+  ("H; "L) = 0. Therefore, for small "; equa-
tion (17) becomes: Z
u (; CE (")) dF () = quH ("H) + (1  q)uL ("L) MC (") : (29)
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Since MC (0) > 0 and, by the Theorem of the Maximum, MC (") is continuous, it follows that
MC (") > 0 for small ": Hence, lim"!0+ MC (") > 0. Then, equation (29) yields:
lim
"!0+
Z
u (; CE (")) dF () > quH (0) + (1  q)uL (0) =
Z
u (; 0) dF () ;
where the last equality follows from Bayesrule. Since u is continuous and increasing in money, this
implies that lim"!0+ CE (") > 0: Hence, lim"!0+  (") =" =   lim"!0+ CE (") =" < 0. 
Proof of Proposition 15: Since MC (") = 0 for all "; equation (17) becomesZ
u (; CE (0)) dF () = quH ("H) + (1  q)uL ("L) + z ("H; "L) : (30)
Substituting  (0; 0) = 0; yieldsZ
u (; CE (0)) dF () = quH (0) + (1  q)uL (0) :
Therefore, Bayesrule implies that
R
u (; CE (0)) dF () =
R
u (; 0) dF () and, because u is strictly
increasing in money,  (0) =  CE (0) = 0:
Di¤erentiating equation (30), it follows that
CE0 (0) =
qu0H (0)H + (1  q)u0L (0)L+ z (H   L) [u0H (0)  u0L (0)]
qu0H (CE) + (1  q)u0L (CE)
:
Substituting qH + (1  q)L = 0; yields
CE0 (0) = K [u0H (0)  u0L (0)] ;
where K = Hqu0H(0)+(1 q)u0L(0)

q + z1 q

> 0: Thus, applying LHospital, we obtain
lim
"!0+
 (") =" =  CE0 (0) =  K [u0H (0)  u0L (0)] ;
which concludes the proof. 
D2 Remarks and Examples
Proof of the claim in Remark 1: Let ̂ and  denote the cumulative distribution functions of
̂̂ 2
n
̂L; ̂?; ̂H
o
and  2 fL; Hg ; respectively. ̂̂ second-order stochastically dominates  if,
for any concave function g : ! R;Z
g

̂̂

d

̂̂


Z
g () d () : (31)
But Z
g () d () = qg (H) + (1  q) g (L) ; and
Z
g

̂̂

d

̂̂

= q (mH + H) g (H) + [q (1 mH   H) + (1  q) (1 mL   L)] g

̂?

+(1  q) (L +mL) g (L) :
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Substituting in inequality (31) and dividing by q (1 mH   H) + (1  q) (1 mL   L), we ob-
tain:
g ( (mL;mH) H + [1   (mL;mH)] L)   (mL;mH) g (H) + [1   (mL;mH)] g (L) ;
which is true because g is concave. 
Example 5: It is helpful to separate the analysis in 2 cases: (i) q  25 ; and (ii) q <
2
5 : In case (i),
self 2 chooses a high ex-post action, b (?) = bH when she expects self 1 to manipulate her memory,
mL =   23 : In case (ii), she chooses a low ex-post action, b (?) = bL when she expects mL =  
2
3 :
Case (i):
The DM chooses to manipulate her memory if
1  2
3

[vL (bL) +  (L)]
+
2
3
f [vH (bL) +  (L)] + (1  ) [vL (bL) +  (L)]g
   L

 2
3

> vL (bL) +  (L) ;
where  denotes the weight implies by Bayesrule. This inequality is satised if and only if  > 332 :
Substituting the denition of , we obtain q > 231 ;which is satised since q 
2
5 >
2
31 :
The ex-ante expected utility from the signal is thus
q [vH (bH) +  (H)] +
2
3
(1  q) [vL (bH) +  (L)]
+ (1  q)

1  2
3

[vL (bL) +  (L)]  (1  q) L

 2
3

;
which is equal to 83q+112 : If the DM makes an uninformed decision, she obtains an ex-ante utility of
q [vH (bH) +  (H)] + (1  q) [vL (bH) +  (L)] if b = bH ; and
q [vH (bL) +  (H)] + (1  q) [vL (bL) +  (L)] if b = bL:
Thus, her utility is 7q if q  12 ; and 5q + 1 if q <
1
2 : The surplus from observing the signal is then
83q + 1
12
 max f7q; 5q + 1g =

1 q
12 if q 
1
2 ;
23q 11
12 if q <
1
2
;
which is positive if and only if q > 1123 :
Case (ii): In this case, because b (?) = bL; the signal has no value. Therefore, the DM is always
(weakly) better o¤ by not observing the signal. In particular, since she exerts memory manipulation
if q  231 ; the surplus is strictly negative for q >
2
31 and it is equal to zero if q <
2
31 :
Example 6: Following the same steps as in Example 5, it is straightforward to show that the surplus
from observing the signal S is equal to
(1  q)

3
4
  m

if q  1
2
; and
2q   1 + (1  q)

1  m  1
4

if q <
1
2
:
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Therefore, S is always positive when q  12 : Furthermore, for q <
1
2 ; it is positive if and only if
2q   1 + (1  q)

1  m  1
4

 0;
which simplies to
3
4
  1  2q
1  q  m:
Noting that m is distributed according to the c.d.f.  concludes the proof.
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